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I.

Introduction

In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis, financial
regulation in the European Union, following an international trend,
underwent a process of intensive legal reforms that led to the revision of the
legal premises underpinning the EU architectural framework for financial
regulation and supervision. The EU has attempted to design a better
equipped supranational apparatus for the governance of financial markets
and crises. This effort accompanies a more general questioning of the role
of law in the financial sector. The interaction between financial entities
and legal rules has been re examined and novel theories have focused on
the idea that legal norms are constitutive elements of finance,1 rather than
exogenous phenomena that intervene upon markets’ spontaneous order as a
deus ex machina. In addition, the behavioral dynamics influencing the
1. Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J.
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choices financial consumers, professional investors and other actors of the
financial markets has been scrutinized. The interaction between financial
markets and regulators has been also considered through an enriched,
socio-legal vision.2 These novel approaches helps to understand that the
interaction among regulators, financial entities and consumers occurs
through legal and social constructions. Furthermore, the postulate of
rationality developed in financial economics and influencing the regulators’
understanding of finance has been questioned.3 It is now largely
understood that individual cognitive processing has limited capacity and
that the brain economizes upon such processing by relying on heuristics
and other shortcuts, which will save time but also generate biases and
predictable errors.4 Behavioral finance moved from the fringes of financial
economics to the mainstream stage:5 Regulatory actions are refined in order
to take into account these insights that depart from the traditional
rationality paradigm.6
Despite this attention towards the social and psychological dimensions of
finance, the behavioral dynamics defining regulators’ modus operandi remains an
uncharted area. Echoing the distinction between “rules of the game” and “players”
as key components of markets elaborated in the literature of institutional
economics,7 regulators are at best depicted as players and thus considered as units,
in the form of social actors or organizations. Albeit offering a useful simplification,
such an understanding neglects that organizations are composed of individuals
with objectives that may conflict, even if operating in a cooperative fashion under
an overarching structure.8 Veering from this unitary conception, there is a
flourishing literature in anthropological and sociological studies that considers

2. Julia Black, Reconceiving Financial Markets – From the Economic to the Social, 13 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 401 (2013).
3. In the UK, see Financial Services Authority (FSA), The Turner Review: A Regulatory
Response To The Global Banking Crisis, Ref. No. 003289 (March 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
4. Kristine Erta et al., Applying Behavioral Economics at the Financial Conduct Authority,
Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper No. 1 (April 2013), available at https://www.
fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-1.pdf.
5. This is witnessed by the fact that Robert Shiller, considered one of the fathers of
behavioural finance, shared in 2013 the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel with Eugene Fama, commonly referred as the father of the efficientmarkets hypothesis, based on the rationality postulate.
6. Emilio Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance Regulation: In
Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 23 (2009).
7. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 3 - 5 (Cambridge University Press 1990).
8. See generally, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, What are Institutions?, 40 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 1 (2006).
OF
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administrative agencies, such as regulators, as collective entities.9 Through these
lenses, supranational regulatory and supervisory outcomes stem from decisionmaking processes organized by legal provisions that define: membership criteria,
organizational structures with collegial governing bodies, powers, responsibilities,
as well as goals and objectives for each institutions.
For our purpose, and drawing from these studies, financial regulators
are considered as organizations composed of individuals. The conduct of
those individuals are impacted by the legal design as well as by the conduct
of other individuals and organizations, such as investors, depositors, and
various financial firms populating the heterogeneous financial ecosystem.
The external relationship of regulators towards regulated sectors, the public at
large, or the political powers, have received extensive consideration in the
regulatory literature.10 Our paper examines how the legal dimension
influences the relational dynamics within regulators. Drawing on insights
from social psychology, regulators appear to reach decisions through
processes that can be identified and analyzed as collective decision
making,11 shaped by social roles, cultural norms as well as legal design.
Social psychology provides a language that enables to capture and analyze
these aspects,12 as it focuses on the result of individual interactions within
or among groups.13 Social psychology provides an analytical grid that, for
the first time, our paper uses to examine financial regulatory agencies.
Against this backdrop, we focus on the EU institutions directly
involved in the governance of financial markets with the primary objective
of identifying whether basic sociopsychological models could be associated
with the legal framework. For this purpose, we examine the legal rules and
the EU constitutional framework under which regulatory bodies operate. EU
institutions perform their activities and roles within the perimeters of EU law,
as defined by the constitutional provisions enshrined in the Treaty of the
9. See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (Syracuse University Press 1986)
10. See generally, ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY AND PRACTICE (Oxford University. Press 2012).
11. See Floyd H. Allport, A Structural Conception of Behavior: Individual and Collective Structural Theory and the Master Problem of Social Psychology, 64 J. OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (1962).
12. A classical definition of social psychology was given by Gordon Allport: “Social
psychology is the attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feeling, and behaviours of
individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of other human being”; GW
Allport, The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 1, at 5 (G. Lindzey ed., Addison-Wesley 1954).
13. Although there is some overlap between sociology and social psychology, there are
also differences. Sociologists tend to relate social behaviours to norms, roles, social class
and other structural variables. Differently, social psychologists focus on the goals, motives and
cognitions of individuals operating in a social context.
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European Union (TEU)14 and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU).15 The dynamics amongst the members composing the main
decision-making bodies of these institutions are examined with reference to
public documents, such as judicial decisions, official communications, and
independent reviews of EU institutions. This enables us to focus on the
relational dynamics defining regulators’ actions — with reference to their
primary decision-making bodies — and to relate them to the ‘fundamental
forms of sociality’, as isolated by Alan Fiske in his seminal work.16 Fiske,
bridging different studies and building upon own ethnographic research,
isolates four relational modes in a unified theory of social relations. The
relational modes are archetypes describing the elementary forms of
sociality featuring in every culture and characterizing all social
interactions. These four models, illustrated in detail in the third part of this
paper, are: i) Market Pricing, ii) Equality Matching, iii) Communal
Sharing, and iv) Authority Ranking.17 They operate in all domains of
social action and cognition, such as transfer of property, standards of social
justice, groups decisions, social influence, organization of labor, moral
judgments, response to suffering, and interpretation of human behaviors.
Combinations between the four models result into various forms of social
interactions pursuant to general cultural rules.18 At a more fundamental
level, “the relational models theory explains social life as a process of
seeking, making, sustaining, repairing, adjusting, judging, construing, and
sanctioning relationships.”19
The analysis of EU financial regulators through the prism of the four
fundamental forms of sociality has the potential of opening up new
perspectives. It can offer a better understanding of how these institutions
works and a robust conceptual framework to consider how conflicts within
and among institutions are likely to arise. However, what cannot be
directly inferred from the behavioral dynamics of specific decision-making
bodies, is the overall psychological attitude (or culture) of the regulatory
14. Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007 [2009], later known as Treaty of the European Union,
consolidated in 2016 C 202/16, O.J [hereinafter TEU].
15. Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007 [2009], Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
consolidated in 2016 C 202/16, O.J [hereinafter TFEU].
16. Alan Page Fiske, The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a Unified Theory
of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 689, 689 (1992) [hereinafter Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality].
17. Identified by Fiske through field study in West Africa and also uncovered at the same
period in other branches of social sciences. See ALAN PAGE FISKE, STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL LIFE:
THE FOUR ELEMENTARY FORMS OF HUMAN RELATIONS (Free Press, 1991). [hereinafter Fiske,
Structures of Social Life].
18. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 690.
19. Id. at 689.
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agencies under scrutiny. In fact, by steering away from the idea that
regulators are unitary entities, various forms of sociality naturally
characterize only specific bodies within agencies and institutions. Yet,
given that these bodies are ultimately responsible for determining critical
regulatory outcomes, mapping their inherent behavioral dynamics appears
to offer a novel set of analytical tools through which regulatory activities
could be examined. To this end, we elicit the underlying core relational
blueprint, or dominant relational model characterizing the decision-making
process of EU institutions in discharging their regulatory functions towards the
financial sector. Particular attention will be given to the European
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the European Supervisory
Authorities. From a theoretical standpoint, a given relational structure calls for
specific decision making processes, group dynamic, and governing values.
However, tensions and prolonged dissents among individuals operating in a
collective structure may extend the natural divergence of opinions and affect
relational dynamics sustaining the cooperative efforts. The article then applies
the analytical framework offered by social psychology to the current issues that
financial, economic, and political crises have exacerbated.
The overhaul of the EU architectural framework for financial
regulation and supervision, leading to the establishment of a Banking
Union and triggering the agenda for a broader Financial Union, generated
constitutional conundrums in the EU primary law. It created overlaps and
tensions amongst EU institutions that are designed to protect the stability of
the single currency and EU institutions that are in charge of the integrity of
the single market as a whole. As a result, an increasingly sharper divide
emerges between Member States taking part to the euro-area (Eurozone)
and Member States whose currency is not the euro (non-Eurozone) and that
are not participating in the Banking Union. This divide furthers with the
threats to the unity of the European project posed by the UK decision to
leave the EU following the results of the referendum (held on June 23,
2016) and generally termed as Brexit. This fragmentation calls into
question the reliance on common values underpinning and guiding the
collective decision-making process of EU financial regulators, when the
representatives of Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries have to cooperate.
Hence, the sociopsychological perspective appears also useful to advance
prospective analyses over a variety of critical aspects affecting the unfolding
European architectural framework for financial regulation and supervision.
As a prerequisite to the sociopsychological examination of EU
financial regulators, the article offers a typology to navigate through the
complex, multilayered EU architectural framework for financial markets
supervisions and regulation. The typology is constructed by reference to
two dimensions: the function of institutions vis-à-vis the common interest
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of the Union, on the one hand; the constitutional status of such institutions,
on the other hand. First, the EU is a sui generis regional structure,
constructed as an international legal community. Its institutions are
inspired by a “common interest,” and are also designed to pursue such
interest, which, in turn, is an autonomous and fluid concept that does not
necessarily overlap with the interests of its individual members. Specific
institutional capacities are required to define the legal and policy contents of
the common interest and to carry on its effective development. Hence, it
emerges that EU regulators perform three key functions vis-à-vis the general
interest of the Union, i.e., advancing and protecting its existence, defining its
content, and ensuring its operation throughout the Union. Second, regulators
may be classified into two main categories, by reference to their constitutional
statuses. Only some financial regulatory institutions are established through EU
primary law: the European Commission (the Commission) and the European
Central Bank (ECB). Other financial institutions in the EU, such as the European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
have been created through secondary laws, whilst supervisory coordination
amongst national authorities over cross-border financial entities and operations
occurs through Colleges of Supervisors and, within the Banking Union, Joint
Supervisory Teams. These are network-based mechanisms, governed primarily
through memoranda of understandings and secondary law provisions.
This typology is not merely descriptive. Beyond the classification of the
institutions, it offers a useful tool to identify how EU institutions operate.
Typically, the two dimensions, i.e., the function of the institutions vis-à-vis the
common interest, first, and the constitutional status of the institutions, second,
bear a direct relationship with specific relational models. This means that
where a given decision-making organ within an institution performs more
than one function, more than one model of sociality is expected to operate.
Also, we find that institutions whose legitimacy and remit is enshrined in the
Treaty framework appear to follow the Communal Sharing and the Equality
Matching forms of sociality, where considerations over common interest and
balance within the group establish the ground for a structured cooperation.
By contrast, notwithstanding the specific reference to the pursuit of the
common interest in the remits of the ESAs, they appear to organize their
social relationship around Market Pricing models, where the maximization
of individual interests, i.e., the interests of Member States advanced by the
individuals composing the decision-making bodies of the ESA, dominates
the group dynamics.
The argument of this article develops in five parts. Part II introduces
the EU multilevel architectural framework for financial regulation and
supervision, stressing the waves of reforms that led to the current
governance apparatus. Subsequently, the concept of common interest is
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introduced and the typology for financial regulators is constructed by
focusing on the Commission, the ECB and the ESAs, with reference to
other form of institutional cooperation among financial regulators. Part III
illustrates the theory of relational models. It then applies it to isolate the
dominant relational modes for each of the above-mentioned institutions
within the EU legal order. Part IV offers an application of the sociopsychological framework in the context of the current tension between
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. Conclusive remarks will follow in
Part V.

II. The Architectural Framework for Financial Regulation in
the European Union
The EU multilevel governance developed to provide new mechanisms
to address an increasingly complex and diverse range of policy issues
requiring enhanced supranational coordination.20 In its current form, it
strongly departs from the initial design, whereby the supranational
decision-making process was confined to specific domains that were dealt
within the fora offered by Treaty-based institutions, largely following the
unanimity principle amongst founding members.21 The EU governance
framework has evolved into a broader apparatus with its own system of rules
and procedures, where the recourse to delegated legislations follow the logics
of the “regulatory state.”22 These developments lie at the core of the transition
from the Common Market to the Internal Market overarching aim, as
introduced with the Single European Act and reinforced, in particular, by the
Treaty of Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaty.23 However, the translation of
the general EU principles into administrative and regulatory actions
advancing the integration of national financial markets proved to be one of
the most difficult ambits for the European project.24
20. On the emergence of multi-level governance in different sectors, see e.g., David Coen &
Mark Thatcher, Network Governance and Multi-Level Delegation: European Networks of
Regulatory Agencies, 28 J. OF PUB. POL’Y 49 (2008).
21. See, e.g., Jacques Pelkmans, The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and
Standardization, 25 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 249 (1987).
22. See, e.g., Giandomendico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 w.
eur. pol. 77 (1994); see also, Thomas Christiansen, Goverance in the European Union, in
MICHELLE CINI & NIEVES PEREZ-SOLORZANO BORRAGAN, EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS (5th ed.
2016) (for an evolution of the EU governance approaches).
23. The Single European Act, 1987 (L169) O.J. 29, paved the way to economic and
monetary union set forth in the Treaty of Maastricht.
24. See generally, Lucia Quaglia, “Old” and “New” Politics of Financial Services
Regulation in the European Union, 17 NEW POL. ECONOMY 515 (2012); see also, Emiliano
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The resulting architectural framework for financial regulation and
supervision in the EU designs a complex institutional arrangement that
involves supranational institutions and national authorities linked through
mechanisms of cooperation and coordination. General policy objectives,
such as the integration of financial services or the maintenance of financial
stability, justify regulatory and supervisory convergences that are
increasingly more centralized at the supranational level. The authorities
involved in these tasks respond to different logics that are set forth in the
constitutional premises of EU primary laws and influenced by the interests
of Member States, which may not necessarily collimate with those of the
Union at large. After presenting the developments leading to the current
multilevel governance framework for financial regulatory governance, the
various institutions involved are considered in light of the function they
perform towards the advancement, the identification, and the realization of the
EU general interest. It will emerge that the different levels of institutional
engagement with the broad — and often vague — overarching goal of
pursuing a common interest characterize the relational dynamics within
institutions, which may ultimately affect their decision-making process.

A.

The EU Multi-level
Regulation

Governance

of

Financial

The modern architectural framework for financial regulation and
supervision in the EU is rooted in the Treaty framework and builds upon a
series of profound reforms spanning decades. For exposition clarity, three
consecutive phases of reform could be isolated, starting from the turn of the
century. Each phase sets the legal and institutional premises upon which new
legal and regulatory changes have been implemented. The first phase,
covering the first years of the new millennium, was marked by the
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), comprising 42
measures — to be adopted over six years (1999-2004) — intended to
harmonize the legal rules affecting various aspects of banking, insurance
and securities sectors as well as other forms financial services.25 The
enterprise followed the primary policy objective of establishing an
integrated financial market, given that its development was lagging behind
Grossman, Network European Financial Integration: Finally the Great Leap Forward?, 49 J. OF
COMMON MKT. STUD. 413 (2011); For an earlier comment, see EU Securities Market
Regulation: Adapting to the Needs of a Single Capital Market, Centre for European Policy
Studies Task Force, Report No. 34 (Mar. 1, 2001).
25. See Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999)
232, European Commission (May 11, 1999).
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the general process of economic integration. A high level of legal
harmonization, mutual recognition and the passport rule were the core
principles to ensure a single market for financial services. The backbone of
this ambitious plan was offered in the Lamfalussy Report,26 which also
established the ground for a novel rule-making process, commonly referred
to as the Lamfalussy Process.27 The Lamfalussy Process, gave a new
legislative impetus and affirmed the prominence of the EU institutional
apparatus in the rule-making process, with a consequential curtailment of
the regulatory powers of Member States. With the completion of the FSAP
a process of review started, characterized by a relative tranquility and, more
generally, by the archival of the Constitutional Treaty and the adoption of
the Lisbon Treaty.
The second and the third phase have been initiated during the Seventh
European Parliament (2009-2014) and continue to present days, with the
Eighth European Parliament (2014-2019). In particular, the second phase is
marked by the reforms adopted as a response to the Global Financial Crisis
that affected European countries as a diffused credit crisis, a sovereign debt
crisis, and the consequential eurocrisis. While markets and regulators were
enjoying a period of regulatory pause after the adoption of the FSAP, the
unfolding crises required profound revisions with a shift in the primary
objectives. The establishment of a single market mutated into the
necessity of preserving its integrity by designing new rules and a new
institutional framework to prevent and cope with financial crises at the
supranational level. The de Larosière Report on the Global Financial
Crisis offered the blueprint for such reforms. 28 One of the first
measures consisted in the establishment of a European System of
Financial Supervision (ESFS), 29 which transformed the Lamfalussy
committees into three ESAs and established the ESRB, entrusted with
the responsibility of overseeing the integrity of the European financial
system.30 The ESAs are composed of representatives of Member States’
regulatory authorities and are: the European Banking Authority
26. A. Lamfalussy, D. Wright & P Delsaux, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men
on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, 85, 89, 93, & 95 (Feb. 15, 2001).
27. For a comprehensive review of the rule-making process enacted through the Lamfalussy
Process see Niamh Maloney, The Lamfalussy Legislative Model: A New Era for the EC Securities
and Investment Services Regime, 52 INT’L AND COMP. L. Q. 509 (2003) (for a comprehensive review
of the rule-making process enacted through the Lamfalussy Process).
28. The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: Report, The de Larosiere
Group (Feb. 25, 2009).
29. Council Directive 2010/78, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 120, 120 (EU).
30. Council Regulation 1092/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1, 2 (EU); Council Regulation 1096/2010,
2010 O.J. (L 331) 162 (EU).
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(EBA),31 the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
(EIOPA),32 and the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA).33 The roles among various EU institutions and Member States
resulted segmented following a three-layered allocation of
responsibilities. These are:
i.)

A supranational level, where the Commission acts as primary
financial regulator, with rule-drafting and policy-setting
prerogatives established by EU primary laws to define a
harmonized set of rules.

ii.)

A national level, where supervisory tasks have been primarily
allocated. Member States’ administrative authorities have
been called to ensure the application of the EU law under the
principle of mutual recognition and the passport rule and
supervisory responsibilities have been distributed between
‘home’ and ‘host’ jurisdictions for cross-border financial
entities and operations. A further mechanism of coordination
has been offered by an increased reliance on Colleges of
Supervisors, which are network-based structures of national
authorities established to supervise multinational entities.

iii)

The intermediate level was introduced with the establishment of
the ESAs. The ESAs offer both technical assistance to the
Commission in the drafting of regulatory standards and
coordination in conducting supervisory tasks. Hence they are
intended to enhance both ‘horizontal’ cooperation, i.e., among
national authorities, and ‘vertical’ cooperation, i.e. between
national authorities and the Commission.34

The third phase of institutional reforms is landmarked by an
enhancement of supranational centralization, with the establishment of a
Banking Union, which, since 2014, has acquired more definitive legal

31. Council Regulation 1093/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12 (EU) [hereinafter EBA Regulation].
32. Council Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48, 49 (EU).
33. Council Regulation 1095/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84, 85 (EU) [hereinafter ESMA
Regulation].
34. Giuliano G. Castellano et al., Reforming European Union Financial Regulation: Thinking
through Governance Models, 23 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 409 (2012).
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contours.35 The Banking Union is composed of a Single Rulebook, a
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM),36 a Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM),37 and a Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme.38 From an
institutional perspective, the SSM and the SRM substantially modifies the
geometry of the architectural framework in the EU. In fact, in the SSM, the
ECB has been tasked with the power to directly and indirectly supervise
credit institutions operating in Member States that adopts the euro as a
common currency as well as those of EU countries that decide to join.
Whereas rule-making prerogatives largely belong to the Commission in
conjunction with the ESAs — in particular, to the EBA — the supervision of
approximately 6,000 banking institutions has been allocated to the ECB within
the SSM. Albeit the enforcement relies on national authorities, the ECB
enjoys direct sanctioning powers. New coordination mechanisms have been
established and the daily supervisory activity is carried out through Joint
Supervisory Teams, composed of staff from both the ECB and the competent
authorities of Member States where regulated credit institutions operate.
The SRM took effect on January 1, 2016, and represents the legal and
institutional framework for the orderly resolution and recovery of banks
within the Banking Union. The SRM is aligned with the needs of ensuring
the integrity of the single market and complements the SSM by establishing
Single Resolution Board (SRB),39 which represents the resolution authority
for the financial entities directly supervised by the ECB (plus all crossborder groups) and oversees national competent authorities. The SRB
administers the Single Resolution Fund.40 The Fund is made up of the
contributions of market participants — primarily, but not exclusively, banks
— of the nineteen Member States participating to the Banking Union. It
supports bank resolutions and is the first line of defense in case of a major
financial crisis that requires public funds to rescue troubled financial
institutions while ensuring the viability of their businesses. The SSM and the
SRM are essential elements of the Banking Union and represent a new
configuration of powers and responsibilities between the central
35. See Niamh Moloney, European Banking Union: Assessing Its Risks and Resilience, 51
COMMON L. MKT. REV. 1609 (2014) (for a comprehensive assessment of the EU Banking Union);
But see, David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding the Single
Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe's Banks and ‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary
Union, 51 NEW POL. ECON. 103 (2013) (on the different positions of EU Member States).
36. Council Regulation 1024/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63, 63 — 64 (EU).
37. Council Regulation 2015/81, 2015 O.J. (L 15/1) 1 (EU).
38. Council Common Position 2014 No. 49/2014, O.J. (L 173) 149 (EC).
39. Council Regulation 806/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 225) 1 (EU).
40. Council Agreement 8457/14, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single
Resolution Fund, May 14, 2014.
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(supranational) level and national supervisory structures.
The new institutional arrangement does not replace the
aforementioned tripartite distribution of competencies and responsibilities
that applies across the entire Union. However, as far as the Banking Union
is concerned, the segmentation between supranational rule-making and
national supervision is substantially reduced. As further illustrated below,
the resulting institutional arrangement stretches the boundaries of EU
primary law and, in consideration of the different constitutional status of
the ECB, the Commission, and the EBA, institutional conflicts may result.
The trend towards a progressive centralization based on the collaboration
with national authorities is likely to characterize the proximate future of EU
financial regulation. While in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis
the attention has been primary towards the banking sector and financial
stability constituted the primary policy objective for financial regulation,41
the idea of deepening the integration across all financial sectors emerges
distinctively from the Capital Markets Union project, as President Junker
declared in his opening statement to the European Parliament.42

B.

The Common Interest in EU Financial Regulatory
Framework

From the above, it is possible to identify in the key institutional
players specific functions vis-à-vis the constitutional framework
established by the Treaties. Such a functional account differs from the
more traditional distinction between institutions tasked with rule-making or
supervisory powers.43 In particular, it is possible to isolate three main
functions that EU institutions involved in the governance of financial
markets should perform under the EU primary laws. These are: (i) the
safeguard and the advancement of a pan-European common interest; (ii)
the definition of its contents, with regards to financial regulation; and (iii)
the operative application of the measures enacted to protect or advance
such a common interest.
Recognizing and protecting a common interest lies at the roots of the
41. Niamh Moloney, The Legacy Effects of the Financial Crisis on Regulatory Design in the
EU, in Eilís Ferran et al., (eds.), THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
152 (Cambridge University Press 2012).
42. Jean-Claude Juncker, Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session in
Strasbourg, at 18, July 15, 2014, transcript available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs
/jean-claude-juncker---political-guidelines.pdf.
43. See, e.g., NIMAH MOLONEY, EU SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION
(Oxford EU Law Library, 3d. ed., Oxford University Press 2014).
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European project. Yet its precise definition escapes specific legal
parameters and appears to be a concept that generally reflects the ethos of
the European project; a plurality of national interests is collapsed into the
interest of one community where resources are shared through the
establishment of a single market. The Treaty of Paris of 1951 and Treaty
of Rome of 1957 intended precisely to design an international legal
framework to share resources among European countries in order to ensure
the political and economic stability of the region. As Robert Schuman
stated in the Declaration of May 9, 1950, “[t]he solidarity in production
thus established will make it plain that any war between France and
Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”44
The creation of a common market was, in fact, based on the pooled
production of coal and steel. This established the roots for a common
interest and, in turn, required a supranational governance structure to
safeguard and advance such an interest, namely the High Authority from
which the modern Commission derives. Upon this idealized construction,
the common interest may be originally conceived as the interest in, first,
creating and, then, protecting a single market.45
The evolution of the European project, leading to a Union, builds upon
this embryonic supranational apparatus, which progressively enlarged,
reflecting the expansion of the perimeters of the common interest.46
Further developments and elaborations provided by European institutions
and, in particular, by the European Court of Justice, reveal that the common
interest is not a static concept. Rather it constitutes the essential bond for
constructing the European project and for identifying Europe as a
community. Hence, the common interest seems to coincide with the
preservation of the community in itself and, as such, it is superior to and
autonomous from the interests of individual Member States.
Since the landmark decision in Van Gend en Loos,47 EU law
transcends national laws and diverges from traditional international legal

44. Robert Schuman, A United States of Europe, speech recorded in SELECTION OF TEXTS
CONCERNING INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS OF THE COMMUNITY FROM 1950 TO 1982, 47, European
Parliament Committee on Institutional Affairs (1982).
45. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R.,
2-15 (this point emerges from the decision in this case, and is further illustrated below) [hereinafter Van
Gend en Loos].
46. See, DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW, Ch. 1 (Cambridge University Press,
3d ed., 2014) (Chapter One provides a complete account of the evolution of the European Communities
and the subsequent establishment of the European Union).
47. Van Gend en Loos, supra note 45, at 4. In 2013, the Court of Justice marked the 50th
anniversary of the judgment highlighting the constitutional importance of the judgment, see
Conference Proceedings, May 15, 2013, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_95693/en/.
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arrangements by creating a legal community whose members are: states,
national administrations, as well as citizens, industries and corporations. The
judgment defined Europe as a legal community based on a new legal order that
is independent from national legal systems. Its members have direct
relationships with the legal community through a series of rights and
obligations that are justified by the pursuit of common interest. The
common interest is defined by the Court as the establishment of a common
market,48 which translated into the commitment to establish a functioning
internal market, pursuant to Article 26 of the TFEU.
A modern reading of Van Gend en Loos indicates that the Court
established the premises for a strong leadership of EU institutions towards
Member States. EU institutions have the monopoly over both the pursuit of
community’s interest and the teleological reasoning that determines
whether a specific action is legitimized under the pursuit of such a common
interest.49
The authority thereby established appears to define a
hierarchical organization well summarized in the doctrine of supremacy of
European law over national law.50 These considerations have merit in
offering a deeper understanding of the dynamics shaping the European
constitutional architecture. Nonetheless, they have to be juxtaposed to the idea
that Member States accept their subordination to a supranational community
not under a federalist legal doctrine. Rather they accepted a voluntarily act of
subordination, in specific areas, towards a community in which they are active
and integral components. This organization serves to both expand and
advance the common interest of the community through its translation into
objectives that could be pragmatically pursued by the EU governance
apparatus. For instance, the measures to increase the integration of
financial services in the last decades have been identified by the
Lamfalussy and the de Larosiere reports, which were then put forward by
the Commission.51
In the context of financial markets governance, financial stability is
not a direct interest of the EU legal community. Instead, it is a derived
objective that emanates from the overarching interest of, first, integrating
financial services through the free circulation of capital and services as
currently enshrined in TFEU Article 26(2), and, then, by preserving the

48. Id.
49. Damian Chalmers & Luis Barroso, What Van Gend en Loos Stands For?, 12 INT’L J. OF
CONST. L. 102, 113—114 (2014).
50. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. National Electricity Board (ENEL), 1964 E.C.R. 587–601.
51. More generally, the steps necessary for the establishment of an internal market have been
advanced by Lord Cockfield in the White Paper on Completion of Internal Market. See Completing
the Internal Market, 85 COM 310 (1985).
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integrity of integrated financial markets. Following the 2007-2009
financial crisis, the necessity for international and supranational efforts to
ensure financial stability and curb systemic risk became evident, given that
the decisions purely driven by national interests could compromise the
stability of the single market.52 In pursuing this enlarged dimension of the
common interest, the EU legal order has expanded to include financial stability
as a central element; particularly for Member States adopting the common
currency, which automatically join the Banking Union. From the above it
emerges that the common interest is a fluid concept that changes depending on
the needs of community.

i. Institutions Warranting the Existence of The Common
Interest.
Within this constitutional framework the Commission — first, as the
Commission of the European Communities, then, as the European
Commission — represents, in its own words, the ‘embodiment’ of the common
interest.53 The Commission is thus conceived and designed as an institution
that is divorced from the interests of individual Member States. It has been
noted that the notion of fonction publique européenne (European civil
service) cites the administrative functions of the Commission above
national politics and defines the authority under which its officers perform
their duties and tasks.54 This role and identity derives directly from EU
primary law and it has been reaffirmed with the Lisbon Treaty. The
Commission is expected to be a guardian, by overseeing the correct and
harmonious application of European law across the EU55 and by acting as
both the police and the prosecutor of the Union.56 It also acts as a
gatekeeper by channeling the interests of different groups into legislative
proposals that are (or should be) in line with the common interest of the
52. For instance, in the context of the resolution of large, cross-border financial institutions
Rosa M. Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability 6 CAP. MARKETS L. J. 197 (2011);
Dirk Schoenmaker, Banking Supervision and Resolution: The European Dimension 6 L. & FIN.
MARKETS REV. 52 (2012).
53. European Commission, The European Commission: 1995-2000, 7 (DGX, Ofﬁce for
Ofﬁcial Publications of the European Communities 1995).
54. CRIS SHORE, BUILDING EUROPE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 178
(Routledge 2013).
55. Treaty of Lisbon art. 17, Dec. 18, 2007 [2009].
56. See R. Schütze, European Constitutional Law 194 (2d ed., Cambridge University Press
2016). The Commission’s role of main protector of the Union notably emerges from its ability of
commencing infringement procedures against Member States (TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 258,)
and other EU Institutions (TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 263).
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Union.57 Moreover, the Commission enjoys quasi-legislative and policysetting powers that define the contents of the common interest; albeit, it has
direct legislative powers only on specific fields related to the protection of
the common interest,58 as further illustrated below.
The multifaceted and evolving nature of the common interest is also
reflected in the evolution of European primary law. In particular, by virtue
of the Maastricht Treaty,59 the Community’s interest expanded with the
inclusion of “economic and monetary union” — immediately after the
reference to the “common market” — amongst the objectives of the
Community enumerated in EC Treaty, Article 2.60 Such an addition
resulted in two major consequences. First, it expanded the role of the
Commission in new areas and, second, offered the constitutional ground,
also in the core objectives of the Community for establishing the European
System of Central Banks, chaired by a supranational central bank. The
need for a European central bank became apparent precisely with the
decision to move towards a monetary union. The ECB hence came into
existence in 1998 and assumed its formal functions starting January 1,
1999, when the euro was introduced as common currency. The process
appears a natural development when the emergence of national central
banks is considered. In the 17th Century, starting with the Swedish
Riksbank and the Bank of England,61 national central banks emerged in
Europe to regulate money supply. Their role and structure evolved from
purely private institutions to entities performing a public function. Once
embedded in the legal, or even constitutional framework, central banks
traditionally discharged their tasks through higher degrees of institutional
autonomy and independence from political powers.62
Within the European context, the establishment of the ECB as an
autonomous body protecting the interest of the monetary union was
ambiguous. First, the Maastricht Treaty included the provisions on
57. DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW, 72 (Cambridge University Press, 3d ed., 2014).
58. Specifically, the Commission may take directives or decisions to Member States to ensure
that public undertakings are compliant with the provisions of the TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 106(3),
and it may regulate the conditions under which EU nationals may remain in the territory of a Member
State, after having being employed there, pursuant to the TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 45(3)(d).
59. The Treaty of Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992, established the European Union and substantially
amended the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, as amended by Single European Act.
60. Treaty of Rome as reported in Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Oct. 11, 1997, C 340 P. 0173 O.J. [Hereafter EC Treaty].
61. Founded, respectively, in 1664 and in 1694.
62. Rosa M. Lastra, The Evolution of the European Central Banki, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1260
(2012).
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monetary and economic union within the EC Treaty, rather than in separate
protocols or pillars, like the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.63 This signaled an expansion of
the scope of the common interest to cover deeper levels of integration.
Second, a new constitutional balance resulted, whereby the Commission
and other institutions, such as the European Court of Justice, extended their
roles to cover new domains, e.g., by ensuring judicial reviews over ECB’s
decisions.64 Third, notwithstanding the fact that monetary and economic
union are key constitutional objectives, the ECB had an unclear constitutional
status, given that it was not included the pantheon of the Community’s
institutions. Its existence was provided by EC Treaty, Article 8, which was
separated from the provisions concerning other institutions.
Such an ambiguity became evident in, and to some extent resolved by,
the OLAF case.65 The ECB, in rejecting to be subjected to the
Commission’s review, claimed to enjoy a legal personality and autonomy
that should have been considered distinct from those attributed to the other
Community institutions. The Court, largely following the Advocate
General’s opinion, rejected this view, stating that the ECB, in discharging
its task of maintaining price stability, supports the general economic policy
of the European Community, thus should be subjected to its rule of law
even while enjoying a great degree of autonomy. 66 As a result, even if the
ECB performs its monetary policy to preserve the interest of the monetary
union, and the euro, the principal guardian of the general Community’s
interest, that includes the proper functioning of all its institutions, remains
the Commission.
The Lisbon Treaty reshaped the EU constitutional framework and
deepened the notion of “union” to mark an intensified European
integration. The pervasiveness of European supranational structure and the
idea of “community” was strengthened by building on established legal
principles of European Law to further partition the interests of individual
members from those of the community at large. After the years spent in
vain on the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty has marked a new
ambitious step more reassuringly rooted in the acquis communautaire.
63. For an historical account, see DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN
UNION, 240 (Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke 2004).
64. EC Treaty, supra note 60, at art. 230.
65. C-11/00 Commission v. European Central Bank, 1999/726, 1991 E.C.R. (EC).
66. A position sustained by various commentators, see, e.g., J-V Louis, The Economic
and Monetary Union: Law and Institutions, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 575 (2004); Rojer J.
Goebel, Court of Justice Oversight over the European Central Bank: Delimiting the Ecb's
Constitutional Autonomy and Independence in the Olaf Judgment, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
610 (2005).
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Instead of announcing a global revision, the Lisbon Treaty relied on
amendments to the acquis created by the Rome Treaty establishing the
European Community and to the Maastricht Treaty establishing the
European Union. The duality between the European Union and the
European Community collapsed into a renewed European Union. Within
this novel constitutional framework, whose implications affect the entire
European political, economic, and legal spectrum,67 two elements are of
particular relevance for our analysis. First, the central role of the
Commission in protecting the interest of the Union has been reaffirmed, by
ensuring its monopoly of legislative initiative and by explicitly conferring
executive powers to the Commission. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the
Council exclusively held executive powers. Second, the Lisbon Treaty
clarified the role of the ECB, which gained new constitutional status.
TEU Article 13(1) expressly identifies the ECB as one of the core
institutions of the European Union. ECB’s primary objective — laid down
in TFEU Article 127(1) — is the pursuit of monetary stability. This
objective must be pursued without prejudice to the support of general EU
economic policies and contribute to the achievement of the general EU
interests and objective enshrined in Article 3 TEU. In addition, the same
article attributed to the ECB the general objective of contributing to the
overall stability of the financial system and allowed the Council to delegate
the supervision of the banking sector to the ECB.68 It is precisely upon these
constitutional premises that the Banking Union was established. This new
architectural framework illustrates how the ECB participates in the coming
into existence of a new governance function of the Union: the stability of the
financial systems in the Eurozone,69 and the supervision of banking
institutions via the Banking Union.
The Commission and the ECB also enjoy a significant level of
independence and autonomy. TEU Article 17(3) and TFEU Article 245
establish the independence of the Commission and the Commissioners who
should not favor any specific country or body and should pursue the general
interest of the Union. Likewise, Article 130 TFEU ensures the independence
of the ECB and of its governing organs while performing monetary policy
functions. Through TFEU Article 282(3), which refers to independence as
an attribute of the powers granted to the ECB, independence is also

67. For a comprehensive review and analysis of the changes implemented with Treaty
of Lisbon, see PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS, AND TREATY REFORM
(Oxford University Press 2010).
68. TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 127(6).
69. ROBERT SCHÜTZE, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 154 (Cambridge University Press
2012).
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extended to the newly acquired supervisory functions granted to the ECB
within the SSM.70

ii. Institutions Defining the Content of the Common Interest
The definition of the contents of the common interest is reflected in
the powers of EU institutions to adapt it, through policy-setting, rulemaking, interpretative efforts, to the mutating needs of various policy
domains. In other words, the common interest is not a static concept.
Rather it is articulated in a series of specific legislative and regulatory
activity that ensure the survival and, possibly, the thriving of the
community. The European Court of Justice is probably the most
representative EU institution carrying out a constant interpretative activity
to define the contents of the common interest. In the context of financial
regulation, the Commission appears as a key player in expanding the
contours of the common interest and in defining its contents.
Pursuant to TEU Article 17, “the Commission shall promote the general
interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end” (emphasis
added). In discharging its legislative, quasi-legislative and executive roles,
the Commission, other than being a guardian of the Union and its law, acts as an
"engine” of both the European Union and integration process, through its
prerogative of formally proposing legislative bills.71 The responsibility of
initiating the policy-making process extends to setting the annual
legislative program of the Union as well as stimulating the debate over
reforms, usually via Green or White Papers. The leading role of the
Commission in defining the content of the Union’s common interest has
gained intensity through the use of quasi-legislative powers supported by
the “comitology” system. The comitology system consists of specialized
committees, composed of national administrators that assist the exercise of
delegated legislative powers granted to the Commission.72 The wide use of
70. It was debated whether the independence of the ECB would extend also to the newly
acquired supervisory powers; however, the issue has been resolved in favour of an extensive
interpretation of TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 282(3) – given that the norm does not pose any
specific restriction; see Benedikt Wolfers, Thomas Voland, Level the playing field: The New
Supervision of Credit Institutions by the European Central Bank 51 COMMON MARKET L. REV.,
1463, 1487, (2014).
71. Treaty of Lisbon, supra, note 55, at art. 17(2). However, the majority of the Commission’s
bills advance regulations; whereas directives are most commonly originated from the Parliament or
the Council. NEIL NUGENT & MARK RHINARD, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 284 (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2d, 2015).
72. See J. Blom-Hansen, The Origins of the EU Comitology System: A Case of Informal
Agenda-Setting by the Commission, 15 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 208 (2008); Fabio Franchino,
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comitology and delegated legislative powers has raised concerns over the
democratic accountability of a quasi-legislative process pivoting around an
unelected institution.73
In the context of financial regulation, the Lamfalussy Process relied
massively upon the comitology system with the objective, felt particularly
strong before the Global Financial Crisis, of rapidly integrating national
financial industries and markets. Hence, if, on the one hand, the
Lamfalussy Process redesigned the procedures of rule-making with a
greater involvement of specialized committees, the Commission’s FSAP,
on the other hand, provided the legal contents deemed necessary to
establish an integrated market for financial services. To this end, a high
level of detail has characterized the measures contained in the FSAP. The
traditional distinction between regulations and directives blurred with the
progressive abandonment of the minimum harmonization approach –
according to which EU law only establishes minimum standards leaving to
Member States the possibility to add new rules in the transposition process
— in favor of a more pronounced reliance on maximum harmonization,
according to which Member States are expressly prevented from adopting
additional rules.74 Within this framework, the centrality of the Commission
emerges distinctively in defining the contents of financial regulation, and
thereby articulating the elements of the common interest.
After the completion of the FSAP and with the entrance into force of
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 — which coincidentally also marked the postfinancial crisis phase of EU financial regulation — a new definition of the
common interest emerged. As earlier noted, the necessity of enacting
measures to support the creation of a single market mutated into the
necessity of ensuring its integrity by preserving financial stability.
This led to the establishment of the Banking Union, of which the
Commission was the primary promoter.
The establishment of a Banking Union, within the European
Union — aimed at defining a more centralized apparatus in response to
current and, possibly, future financial crises —became a part of the
Commission’s agenda towards deeper economic and monetary
integration. Central to the Banking Union is the Single Rulebook,
which is a set of substantive rules that builds upon and expands the
Delegating Powers in the European Community, 34 BRITISH J. OF POL. SCI. 269 (2004).
73. See id.; see inter alia, Michelle Cini, The European Commission: An Unelected
Legislator?, 8 THE J. OF LEGIS. STUD. 14 (2002).
74. For a comment on the benefits and the drawbacks of these approaches in the context of
securities regulation, see Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, United in Diversity: Maximum Versus Minimum
Harmonization in EU Securities Regulation 7 CAP. MKT. L. J. 317 (2012).
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measures implemented through the FSAP. New capital requirements, 75
harmonized provisions for deposit guarantee schemes, 76 and common
rules for recovery and resolution of troubled banking institutions 77
represent the major novelties in the bulk of EU substantive laws that are
applicable to all credit institutions operating in all Member States. 78 It
has been noted that, rather than a cohesive set of legislative provisions,
the Single Rulebook encompasses a number of measures including
legislative, nonlegislative and implementing acts.79 This is potentially in
conflict with the higher level of centralization sought through the new
institutional structure and prompted distinguished commentators to question
the appropriateness of the term “single rulebook”80 and to highlight the need
for enhanced enforcement mechanisms and approaches.81

iii.

Institutions Ensuring The Operation of The Common
Interest

The safeguard and the definition of the contents common interest
percolate from EU primary laws to secondary legislative acts and
ultimately to the administrative mechanisms that allows the enactment and the
enforcement of EU law across the legal systems of its Members States. It is
precisely the institutional framework enacting regulatory and administrative
provisions that locates a general, programmatic objective and puts it into
operation. In the general context of EU financial regulation, this function
appears to be primarily performed by non-Treaty institutions, namely the
ESAs, with a resulting dilution of the pursuit of a common interest with the
interests of individual Member States. Such a structure is anchored to the
constitutional fabric of EU law that in turn is stretched to create a peculiar
75. Council Directive 2013/36, 2013 O.J. (L 176) (EU), referred to as Capital Requirement
Directives IV (CRD IV); Council Regulation No. 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L176) (EU), referred to as
Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR).
76. Council Directive 2014/49, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EU).
77. Council Directive 2014/59, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EU).
78. To the list of major novelties in financial regulation, the following should be added: the
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (Council Directive 2014/65, 2014, O.J. (L 173) 349(EU));
the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (Council Regulation 600/2014 2014, O.J. (L 173) 84
(EU)), the 2014 Market Abuse Regulation (Council Regulation 596/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 1(EU))
and Council Directive 2014/57 O.J. 2014 (L 173) 179 (EU)).
79. Moloney, European Banking Union, supra note 35 at 1611.
80. Eilís Ferran, European Banking Union: Imperfect, but It Can Work, in, EUROPEAN BANKING
UNION, (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini eds., Oxford University Press 2015).
81. Dalvinder Singh, The Centralisation of European Financial Regulation and Supervision: Is
There a Need for a Single Enforcement Handbook?, 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 439 (2015).
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architectural framework for financial regulation and supervision.
The ESAs (and the ESRB) acquire their legal personality from TFEU
Article 114 . Article 114 stipulates that the European Parliament and Council
may take required measures for the approximation of the provisions contained
in law, regulation, or administrative action of Member States “which have as
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.”
Through the interpretation of Article 114 TFEU offered by the European
Court of Justice and defining the Meroni doctrine on the establishment of
new European authorities,82 the three ESAs and the ESRB are soft-law
bodies;83 or, to use the EU law terminology, they are measures for the
approximation of national laws. The ESAs define Regulatory Technical
Standards and Implementing Technical Standards. They also oversee the
correct implementation and application of EU laws and may intervene in case
of emergency. Their legitimacy in conducting rule-making activity is ascribed
to the provisions of the Treaty governing the exercise of the quasi-legislative
powers attributed to the Commission, specifically TFEU Articles 290 and 291.
Hence, when secondary legislative acts entrust the Commission with the power
to enact a delegated act pursuant to TFEU Article 290, the ESAs draft these
acts in the form of Regulatory Technical Standards. These standards are
then endorsed by the Commission and subjected to the possibility of veto
by the Council and the Parliament, as established by the same article. Also,
in the case of implementing acts, pursuant to TFEU Article 291, the ESAs
draft these acts in the form of Implementing Technical Standards, subject
to the procedures and control contained in that norm. In both instances, the
Commission has limited room to amend those acts or reject them, thus
restricting its role to an activity of oversight on the legality of technical
standards and their conformity with the general interest of the Union.
Furthermore, albeit the Treaty does not contain an explicit possibility for
delegating directly to the ESAs, it is not uncommon for the provisions of
the Single Rulebook, composed of regulations enacted by the Council or by
Parliament, to confer on the ESAs delegated powers.84 In this respect, the
EBA represents the guardian of regulatory convergence and the keeper of
the Single Rulebook of which defines its contents and, in principle, gives it
a sense of cohesiveness.85

82. Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche s.p.a v. High Authority, 1957-1958,
E.C.R. 133; Case 10/56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche s.p.a v. High Authority, 19571958, E.C.R. 157.
83. Eilís Ferran & Kern Alexander, Can Soft Law Bodies Be Effective? The Special Case of the
European Systemic Risk Board 6 EUR. L. REV. 751 (2010).
84. For instance, capital requirements often delegate the EBA to establish specific provisions.
85. Access to the Single Rulebook is granted via the EBA website.
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The amplitude and the pervasiveness of the powers allocated to the
ESAs emerge from a recent case, where the UK sought before the Court of
Justice the annulment of the provision,86 contained in Article 28 of
Regulation 236/2012 regulating short-selling operations.87 That regulation
granted the ESMA the power of adopting legally binding measures in the event
of a threat to the stability or the orderly functioning of the EU financial system.
According to the applicant, TFEU Article 114 was not the appropriate legal
basis for this delegation of powers and was at odds with the constitutional
imbalances of the EU. Moreover, the UK sustained that the Parliament and the
Council do not have any authority under the EU primary law to delegate
powers to a EU body, whose amplitude was deemed to violate the limits set
by the Meroni doctrine. The Court rejected the request of annulment and
noted that the powers conferred to the ESMA are sufficiently restricted and
are thus in conformity with the principles established in Meroni. The Court
further noted that the powers follow a regulatory logic that requires temporary
restrictions, confined to emergency circumstances threatening the integrity of
the single market. Furthermore, consultation with other relevant EU
institutions is required and ESMA’s acts may be challenged through judicial
review, given that the Lisbon Treaty explicitly permits judicial review of
acts of EU agencies and other bodies. This judicial review implies the
possibility a conferral of powers outside the perimeters of delegated
legislation established by Articles 290 and 291.88 The Court also stated
that those binding measures are devices to ensure further coordination and
approximation of national laws, given that the addressees are markets’
participants, only in circumscribed circumstances, when ESMA represents
a regulator of “last resort.”89
The expanded role of nontreaty based institutions exemplifies the rise
of the administrative Union,90 whereby governmental tasks are transferred
to bodies not expressly mentioned in the constitutional design. In the postLisbon settlement, the comitology system has been substituted by a system
of “agencies,” where national representatives are asked to enact the
86. Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2014 Grand Chamber (EU) [hearinafter UK v.
European Parliament and Council].
87. Council Regulation No. 236/2012, 2012, O.J. (L86/1) (EU).
88. Under Article 263 of the TFEU, acts of “bodies, offices” and “agencies” of the Union may be
subject to judicial review by the Court. The rules governing actions for failure are also applicable
pursuant to Article 265. Furthermore, courts and tribunals of the Member States may refer questions
over the validity and the interpretation of those acts in accordance to Article 267. Finally, such acts are
subject to Article 277 governing the pleas of illegality.
89. UK v. European Parliament and Council, supra note 86, at para 108.
90. Cf. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
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common interest of the Union. The decision-making process, thus, follows
a logic — and, as further elaborated below, a relational dynamic — that is
different from the one adopted by supranational, Treaty-based institutions
governed by EU civil servants to advance, or even embody, the common
interest. Albeit it has been argued that the ESAs are structurally
intergovernmental91 and that the national interests are naturally embedded
in the decision-making process of the ESAs. In fact, their governing
organs follow the (simple or qualified) majority voting rule, as does, for
instance, the Council, the EU political institution par excellence.92
The establishment of a Banking Union also had an impact on the role
performed by treaty-based and non treaty-based institutions (and national
authorities) to operate the common interest. As noted earlier, banking
supervision occurs through a single supervisory mechanism, i.e., the SSM,
which is composed of the ECB and national authorities. TFEU Article
127(6) de facto and de jure mandates the advancement of the common
interest to a Treaty-based institution, i.e., the ECB. However, the ECB is
subjected to the rules drafted by the EBA and to a large extent enforcement
is conducted by national authorities and coordination ensured through Joint
Supervisory Teams. In fact, the SSM operates on the basis of a mix of EU
and national legislations;93 thus if a sufficient level of harmonization is not
reached the application of EU laws may be impaired.94 Harmonization is, in
principle, ensured by the Single Rulebook and by the implementing and
delegated standards of the EBA. Nonetheless, national authorities, in
exercising their supervisory tasks, may adopt different approaches and
enforcement strategies, potentially undermining the uniformity sought through
the implementation of common rules.95 All in all, within the Banking Union
the multilevel governance may be summarized as follows:
i.) Two Treaty-based authorities are involved in the regulatory
governance of the EU banking sector. The Commission in
91. Niamh Moloney, The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for
the EU Financial Market A- Tale of Two Competences: Part (1) Rule-Making, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 41, 77 (2011).
92. PAUL CRAIG, COMITOLOGY, RULEMAKING AND THE LISBON SETTLEMENT: TENSIONS AND
STRAINS, RULEMAKING BY THE COMMISSION: THE NEW SYSTEM, (Carl Bergstrom & Dominique
Ritleng, Oxford University Press (2015).
93. See, e.g., European Central Bank Regulation, Art. 4(3), 9(1), 18(5), and 21(4).
94. A problem noted by many. See, e.g., Andrea Enria, European Central Authority Chairman,
The New Role of the European Banking Authority in the Banking Union, ESE Conference in
Frankfurt, (2013).
95. See Valia Babis, Single Rulebook for Prudential Regulation of Banks: Mission
Accomplished? 26 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 779 (2015); Singh, supra note 81.

2017]

EU Financial Regulators

93

exercising policy-setting and quasi-legislative powers (within
the limits just illustrated) ensures both the advancement of the
common interests and the definition of its contents. The ECB
oversees monetary stability and discharges its newly acquired
supervisory functions towards banking institutions operating
in the Banking Union. In so doing, the ECB also safeguards
the common interest while defining its contents.
ii.)

Soft-law bodies, i.e. the ESAs and the ESRB, put into
operation the common interest, by defining technical
standards, and ensuring regulatory and supervisory
convergence both within and outside the Banking Union. In
particular, the EBA and the ESMA, albeit composed of
national representatives, should exercise their powers in line
with the interest of the EU.

iii.) Network-based systems, i.e. Joint Supervisory Teams, ensure
the daily supervision and coordination among national
authorities that, by definition, pursue national interests, but, in
applying common rules, should also operate for the
realization of the common interest.
The resulting framework appears to be complex with different decisionmaking centers. Their structures, procedures, and organizations might
generate new policy conflicts or deeper fragmentation. In particular, the role
of the ESAs and their constitutional configuration pose three critical issues.
First, in this schema, the ECB discharges its newly acquired — yet
enshrined in the Treaty — supervisory duties in line with its general
function of protecting the interest of the monetary union. In operating this
interest, the ECB will apply technical standards (regulatory or
implementing) that have been drafted by an institution not established by
the Treaty, i.e., the EBA, and whose new institutional capacity may
potentially adumbrate the role of treaty-based institutions. Second, the risk
of the EBA to be politicized, as noted also by the International Monetary
Fund, may ultimately undermine the effective operability of the Banking
Union.96 Third and related, the membership of the EBA extends to all EU
countries, bringing together Member States participating in the Banking

96. European Union: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation—
Technical Note on European Banking Authority, 7 — 87, International Monetary Fund Country
Report, No. 13/74 (2013).
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Union and Member States outside that arrangement.
The overlaps of different national and supranational interests,
canvassed in an institutional framework that does not sufficiently
counteract the risk of politicization and with dubious constitutional
contours, may affect the relationship among Member States, in particular
between those that are subjected to the Banking Union and those that do
not participate in it and have not adopted the single currency. The first
group of countries may see the EBA as a forum where undue pressures may
be exercised towards the ECB, undermining its constitutional prerogatives.
The second group, instead, may see in the new supervisory role of the ECB
as a curtailment of their powers to influence the regulatory governance of
the EU through their participation in the EBA. For instance, the EU SubCommittee on Economic and Financial Affairs of the House of Lords,
chaired by Lord Harrison, remarked in a report on the Banking Union that
the SSM, by allocating new powers to the ECB may undermine the
authority of the EBA.97 The EBA Chairman Enria has also highlighted that
a chasm in the single market might emerge, given that Member States
within and outside the SSM jurisdiction are driven by different priorities.98
In this respect, it appears that the primary role of the EBA in the years to
come will be to ensure a link between countries that are participating in the
Banking Union and those that are not, by offering an interpretation of the Single
Rulebook and ensuring coordinated supervision.99 Further convergence in the
regulatory framework and in supervisory practices affecting all EU members
appears to be the primary way forward to minimize the risk of a two-speed
financial market within the EU.
These issues are approached as phenomena related to the relational
dynamics among the individuals participating in the decision-making
process of the relevant EU institutions involved in the regulation and
supervision of financial markets. These relational dynamics are here
examined through the lenses of social psychology that allows identifying the
primary forms of sociality underpinning the governance process. To this
aim, it is necessary to determine how the EU constitutional framework
shapes the relational dynamics within the institutions here considered. This
analysis will assist in elucidating the depth of the concerns animating the
current debate over the institutional design for financial markets governance
in the EU.
97. EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: KEY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES, 2012, H.L. Paper 88, at 28.
98. Andrea Enria, Chairman of EBA, Challenges for the Future of EU Banking, Speech made at
Madrid 3d Financial Meeting, Jan. 2015.
99. Eilís Ferran, The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority, EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 1 (2016).
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III. Forms of Sociality in EU Financial Regulation
Studies in the field of social psychology and anthropology highlight
that relational structures call for specific decision making processes, group
dynamic, and governing values. These structures are defined by four
fundamental relational models, or forms of sociality, which characterize
every group and may coexist within the same group of individuals.100 In
Fiske’s words, all “domains and aspects of social relations may be
organized by combinations of just four elementary models (schemata, rules,
or grammars): communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching,
and market pricing”101 Identifying the sociopsychological models at play
within a given institution enables us to better understand how this institution
works. To this purpose, the typology presented in the previous section elicits
the core legal components that, by setting the premises for a collective action,
contribute to the definition of a specific socio-psychological (or relational)
model and, therefore, to a predictable operating mode also.
Of particular relevance in any collective structure is the prominence
given to a shared objective that could be more or less detached to the
interests of its individual members. In the context of financial regulation,
and EU institutions in general, this is well represented by the identification
of a common (European) interest. EU Institutions that perform different
functions, for instance, by advancing and defining the contents of the common
interests, are expected to display more than one relational model, which adds
to the complexity of the multilayer governance model. Before advancing an
analysis of the sociopsychological models characterizing EU financial
regulators, it is worth introducing the four elementary forms of sociality.

A.

Elementary Forms of Sociality

The theory of social relations identifies four relational models that
characterize any social interaction in every culture.102 Combinations
between these four models build various social forms in accordance to the
contingent cultural framework. Hence, through these lenses the social
dimension of interactions among individuals is understood as a process that
involves “seeking, making, sustaining, repairing, adjusting, judging,
construing, and sanctioning relationships.”103 The four models — i.e. Market
100.
101.
102.
103.

Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 690.
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Pricing (MP), Equality, Matching (EM), Communal Sharing (CS), and
Authority Ranking (AR) — operate in all domains of social action and
cognition, such as transfer of property, definition of standards of conduct,
group decisions, or organization of labor. The core characteristics for each
of these relational modes are briefly presented here, drawing primarily from
Fiske’s unified understanding of the theory of social relations.
Market Pricing represents the most pervasive mode of sociality in
Western cultures.104 Within this form of sociality, relationships among
individuals are based on more or less rational calculations of cost-andbenefit ratios and proceed by self-interested exchange. An illustration of
the decision mechanism that is at play in MP is provided by Adam Smith’s
invisible hand of the market. Market prices or exchange rates are means to
facilitate trade, whereby individuals aim at maximizing their idiosyncratic
values through a transaction. The voluntary nature of an arrangement is
considered as a source of legitimacy and the rationality postulate is often
assumed. While rationality is not a necessary element, MP may, in fact,
characterize a relational arrangement even if choices are not considered
rational. Other than price and exchange mechanisms, MP represents a
driving force that can guide coordinated action towards a general goal, as
long as the goal is pursued through voluntary actions that imply a
calculative attitude. For example, in a hiring process, the establishment of
specific criteria, such as the level of formal education, relies on the value
that — depending on the social and cultural context considered — is
attributed to such criteria. Hence, defined parameters and agreed criteria
are necessary, as are prices, to relational dynamics responding to the MP
logic. Groups operating (primarily) under this mode, require explicit rules,
usually formally stated, to guide their decisions and allow a cost-benefit
analysis. In this model, justifications for the actions taken often rely on a
utilitarian and individualistic logic that is deemed to put forward the
advancement of the general interest. This is, for instance, the rationale
underlying the General Equilibrium Theory, according to which the
interactions amongst multiple, profit-seeking individuals lead to a point of
market equilibrium and, thus, to the maximization of the general welfare.105
Albeit MP is the most common relational mode, it is not the only mode of
relating to others in Western cultures.106 The three other modes are also
present, though in more subtle ways, precisely because the rules governing
104. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16 at 706.
105. Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive
Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA. 265, (1954).
106. See generally, KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES (Beacon Press 2001).
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social interactions remain (often) implicit.
In the Equality Matching mode of relation,107 exchange is also central.
Exchange is so central that some authors conflate EM and MP under the
general label of “exchange relationships.”108 However, in comparison to
MP, EM presents a distinctive focus on ensuring an even balance: Each
member of the group is entitled to the same amount pursuant to egalitarian
and distributive justice principles. In this schema, any imbalance can be
accounted for through the principles of equality and reciprocity. Empirical
studies highlighted a distinct tendency of punishing individuals whose
actions, not obliging to general principles of reciprocity and equality, were
deemed unfair. In particular, when the participants to an experiment were
asked to share a fixed sum with anonymous strangers, identified only by the
distribution they had proposed in a previous round, the large majority opted
to share the amount evenly only with those unknown individuals who had
previously shared their sum evenly.109 Rawls’ theory of justice provides,
with its notorious reference to the “veil of ignorance,” an illustration of the
ethical dynamics underlying EM.110 In fact, the veil of ignorance is a
thought experiment according to which rulers would not know the role that
they will play in a world where they are called to determine the rules.
Under relational models governed through equality a balanced distribution of
resources is incentivized, making no share worse than the others.111 EM
involves distinct individuals who are considered and respected as equals and
whose differences are acknowledged and assessed to reach an optimal point,
which is represented by an even balance.
In Communal Sharing relationships,112 members of a group consider
each other as of the same kind, as belonging to a single group, or as sharing
a common identity. Communal relationships are characterized by mutual
feelings of responsibility for the well-being of other members and of the

107. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 702.
108. Margaret S. Clark & Judson Mills, Interpersonal Attraction in Exchange and Communal
Relationships, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 12, (1979) [hereinafter Interpersonal
Attraction]; Judson Mills & Margaret S. Clark, Exchange and Communal Relationships, in 3 REV.
OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (L. Wheeler ed., Sage 1982) [hereinafter Exchange and
Communal Relationships].
109. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and Assumptions of
Economics, 59 J. BUS. 285 (1986).
110. See, generally, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard University Press 2009).
111. A similar criterion is encountered in economics with the concept of pareto-efficiency,
whereby a given allocation of resources among individuals is considered optimal when it is impossible
to make any individual better off, without making someone worse off; see Vilfredo Pareto, The New
Theories of Economics, 5 J. POL. & ECON. 485 (1897).
112. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 693.
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group as a whole; benefits and concessions are given in response to the
needs of the others without expectation of repayment. By contrast, in
“exchange relationships,” intended as both MP and EM, benefits are given
in response to specific benefits received in the past or with the expectation
to receive benefits in the future.113 While CS is typical of family, romantic
or friendly relationships, the exchange relationships are found more often
among strangers or business associates. Ethnographic research revealed
that CS is also a basis for constituting sociality in stateless, food-harvesting
societies, where ethnical, familial, and religious elements are the main
bonds (or group norm) that create and maintain a community.114 In modern
societies, CS manifests as the cooperative attitude towards a common
objective deployed by individuals within groups and institutions and relates
to the concept of organizational identity, according to which members of
an organization, including public authorities, share an understanding of
what characterizes their organization as distinctive and drives their
collective enterprise.115 Within this framework, members of a group
identify themselves under a common denominator — be it an ideology, a
shared identity, a cultural element, a mission, or a common interest — and
tend to change their behaviors to conform to the behaviors of the others.116
In larger communities, CS is also present. Stereotyped repetitive
actions, traditions, building of rituals, and general principles sustain group
membership and cohesion. There is often an idealization of a general social
norm that keeps the individuals of a group together under the ordering
principles of consensus, unity, and conformity. Upon this idealized social
norm — that glues the group to a common goal — develops the tendency of
the group to take actions that preserve and perpetuate its very existence. The
existence of conflict is not uncommon in CS and it limits the risk of
groupthink, which is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when
members of a group or a community, in order to avoid conflicts, impede
critical thinking.117 This may result in a dysfunctional decision-making
outcome, because the evidence challenging group’s assumptions and
113. The idea is advanced by Clark and Mills, see Interpersonal Attraction, supra note
108; Exchange and Communal Relationships, supra note 108.
114. See Michael E. Meeker, Kathleen Barlow & David M. Lipset, Culture,
Exchange, and Gender: Lessons from the Murik, 1 CUL. ANTHRO. 6 (1986); Fiske,
Structures of Social Life, supra note 17.
115. The concept is well established in the organizational literature, see Stuart Albert
& David A. Whetten, Organizational Identity, 7 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 263 (1985).
116. See Morton Deutsch & Harold B. Gerard, A Study of Normative and Informational Social
Influences upon Individual Judgement, 51 J. ABNOR. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629 (1955).
117. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES (Houghton Mifflin 1982).
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supporting a specific action is uncritically discarded.118
Finally, Authority Ranking relationships reflect a hierarchy between
people who are ordered in a linear manner.119 In AR, individuals are either
above or below each other, depending on the social status attributed in a
specific context. Higher ranked individuals enjoy prestige, prerogatives, and
privileges that those in a lower position do not have. Military ranks are
epitomic of this relational model, which predominantly govern the
interactions between individuals working in the armed forces. There is a
stark difference with the relational organization encountered in both CS
and EM. In AR, resources are allocated depending on the ranking of
individuals instead of being traded, equally distributed, or pooled. When
AR features the decision-making process of a given group, information
moves upward towards the leader who, after assessing them, passes
decisions down through a chain of command. This dynamic has been
observed in situations where individuals emulate, obey, or even worship
superiors,120 but also in the political sphere, where the phenomenon has
been referred to as “authoritative democracy.”121 As noted by Weber, a
hierarchical organization could be imposed through coercion and unilateral
control of resources, but it may be accepted through a process of
ideological validation that recognizes and legitimizes a superior
authority.122 Ultimately, as noted by Freud, it may also spontaneously arise
within a group, when emulation of and identification with the leader
generate herd behaviors.123 In any cases, individuals in AR groups acquire
a sense of self-identity from knowing their place in the hierarchy.124
The four models often coexist and a group or an institution that
operates according only to one model appears to be a rare occurrence. A
combination of the models is more commonly observed in different aspects
118. A recent example offered by the literature, is the United States administration’s
assumptions, then followed by other countries, justifying the Iraqi invasion of 2003; Dina Badie,
Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq, 6 FOR. POL’Y
ANALYSIS 277 (2010).
119. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 700.
120. See CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
(Transaction Publishers 1992).
121. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE (University of California Press 2003).
122. This is reflected in Weber’s distinction of three kinds of legitimate domination, i.e.,
legal, traditional, and charismatic; see MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE
OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 212—215 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., University of
California Press 1978).
123. SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO (W.W.
Norton & Company 1975).
124. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 711.
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of the social interaction. For instance, different social models may be
unconsciously used as templates to interpret the positions of other
individuals in the group, to judge or anticipate others’ actions, and
ultimately to engage in coordinated enterprises, or sabotage them. In this
respect, Fiske observes that the models are used together in a hierarchical
fashion through various phases of a social interaction or in distinct
activities within an institution.125 Albeit there is limited empirical evidence
on the specific driving elements determining what makes a group of
individuals opt for one of the models, or to switch from one model to the
next, it is reckoned that there is a consensus among individuals of a group
in identifying which form of interaction should be used in any given
circumstance.126 In other words, there are cultural and contextual rules that
are shared among members of a group and that drive individuals in
adopting one of the four relational models interactions. Drawing from
these observations it is possible to identify within the legal context of EU
financial regulators the dominant relational rules that underpin the
decision-making process of the considered EU bodies.

B. Models of Sociality in the Financial Regulation Framework
A distinct socio-psychological model is implicitly favored by the legal
framework for each one of the three categories of EU institutions we
isolated in the typology presented in Part II. The specific modus operandi
and the regulatory outcomes of EU institutions, is rooted in the
constitutional fabric of the EU. The allocation of powers, objectives,
duties, and tasks defines, together with the procedures regulating the
members’ appointment and their collective decision-making, a main
relational style for each category. More specifically, the following patterns
are observable: Communal Sharing is a dominant mode for institutions
engaged in recognizing the existence of the common interest; whereas
Equality Matching and Market Pricing are dominant for institutions
defining the content of the common interest, under the principles of mutual
recognition, and for institutions operating the common interest, where
regulatory and supervisory convergence occur through a balancing of the
interests of the community as a whole, with national and industry’s
interests. By contrast, due to the very nature of the EU legal framework,
Authority Ranking does not appear to be a dominant relational model in
125. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 701.
126. See ROBERT A. LEVINE, PROPERTIES OF CULTURE: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC VIEW
(Richard A. Shweder & Robert A. LeVine eds., Cambridge University Press 1984); Fiske,
Structures of Social Life, supra note 17.
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any of the three categories elicited. This is not to say that there is not a
hierarchical organization in the EU legal order (or within its institutions); it
rather means that the linear ordering is minimal when the decision-making
organs driving regulatory and supervisory activities are observed.
However, it may be more pronounced in intra-institutional domains that
rest outside the scope of this analysis.
To shift the focus from the general categories to the relational modes
of specific regulators, EU institutions are here considered as groups of
individuals that organize themselves in collective structures, where the
achievement of one’s activity may only occur if other individuals perform
another task or activity.127 With the intent of isolating the relational
dynamics within the various collective structures engaged with the
governance of financial markets, the distinction between treaty-based
institutions and the other bodies appears to be particularly salient. The
Commission and the ECB are key treaty-based institutions in the new
European financial regulatory framework. Their activities and roles, as
regulators and supervisors, are defined within the constitutional provisions
contained in EU primary law.128 Alongside these institutions operate a
series of nontreaty—based institutions, i.e., the ESAs, the ESRB and
different network-based structures to coordinate the activities of national
authorities. It is worth highlighting that all EU institutions ultimately
concur in shaping the European financial regulatory space. The Court of
Justice, as earlier illustrated, has been called on to define the status of the
ECB, before the Lisbon Treaty, and the powers of the ESAs; the Council
represents the political forum where the regulatory policy agenda is set; and
the European Parliament holds key legislative functions approving or
putting a veto, for instance, on delegated legislative acts. New links are
also emerging, with the increasing practice of delegating and conferring
powers to the ESAs. It is clear that an analysis over the complex nexus of
legal and administrative procedures among these institutions would require
a detailed treatise that is beyond the scope of this work. This analysis,
instead, focuses on the relational arrangements within the EBA, the
Commission and the ECB.
127. This idea draws from Floyd H. Allport, A Structural Conception of Behavior:
Individual and Collective - Structural Theory and the Master Problem of Social Psychology,
64 J. OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (1962). The idea that institutions are
groups of individuals has been also advanced by MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK
Syracuse University Press (1986).
128. They are two of the seven main EU institutions enlisted in Article 13 of the TEU;
the other five being: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the
European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Union (including the General Court
and the Court of Justice), and the European Court of Auditors.
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Upon the basic distinction between treaty-based and nontreaty—
based institutions it is already possible to isolate the primary forms of
sociality characterizing EU institutions involved in financial regulation. As
the dynamics of any group of individuals, from families to companies, may
follow different form of sociality, so more than one form of sociality may
characterize the political, organizational and administrative activities of EU
institutions, and of the Union at large. Hence, EU treaty-based institutions
appear to be engaging with the logics of two primary forms of sociality:
communal sharing that is oriented towards the realization of the
community’s interests, and equality matching that aims at ensuring a
constant balance among Member States within these institutions. This
double (relational) dynamic reflects the duality of the function that EU
treaty-based institutions perform vis-à-vis the common interest. With
regards to the ESAs their ambivalent — and recently acquired — roles lead
to identify as primary form of sociality market pricing. In order to fully
appreciate the ramifications of this perspective, the governance of financial
markets in the EU is examined by looking at the socio-psychological
dimension that transpires from the EU constitutional framework. The
relational dynamics influencing the decision-making process of both treatybased and non-treaty based institutions in the context of EU financial
regulation and supervision are then considered.

i.

The Communal Sharing Form of Sociality and the EU
Constitutional Framework

In general, CS is a direct manifestation of the core features of the European
project from its modern genesis. Commentators have cogently noted that Van
Gend en Loos contains a proclamation of authority of a post-national community
whose attributes supersede those of nation-states and emanate from an idealized
notion of “common interest” —contained in the EU primary law — to justify an
increasingly larger scope of intervention.129 A different reading, one that may
well complement the one just illustrated, could be offered if the idea of common
interest is examined through the lenses of social psychology.
As earlier noted, the idealization of a social norm constitutes precisely
the core bond in CS. Notwithstanding the reasons driving individuals to
organize themselves within such a structure, the existence of a basic
principle — referred to as “group norm” —represents one of the conditions
of existence of a group.130 Individuals adhere to such a group norm that is
129. Chalmers & Barroso, supra note 49, at 105.
130. Allport, supra note 127, at 11.
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generally flexible enough to adapt to new circumstances ensuring a
constant reciprocal rewarding, which in this context refers to a reciprocal
recognition of value among members participating within the same group.
Such a psychological mechanism facilitates the functioning of the group even
when individuals are not fully aware of the specific activities of other
members, but they are necessarily aware that their contributions converge
towards the common interest of the group.131 In focusing on the positions of
individual Member States the point may be easily missed. At the national level,
in fact, the debate often focuses on national interests that, following the narrative
of “limited sovereignty,”132 are in contrast to those pursued by EU institutions.
When a group perspective is acquired to study the decision making process the
idea of an underlying common interests emerges more distinctively.
The presence of conflicts and opposing interests is an element that
characterizes CS forms of sociality and may signal the lack of groupthink.
For instance, it is in pursuit of a common interest that divergent positions
converged into the establishment of a Banking Union, which requires
pooling more resources and the abdication of more sovereign powers
towards supranational authorities. Germany advocated for a more limited
authority for the ECB. In particular, given that the German banking market
is one of the less concentrated markets in the Eurozone, direct supervisory
powers over small banks, such as the Sparkassen (savings banks), appeared
as excessively intrusive to the German government.133 Similarly, the UK
supported the creation of a Banking Union amongst Eurozone countries to
strengthen the single market and ensure financial stability, albeit opposing
to subjecting to it. France, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands have
advocated for greater ECB powers.134 Once these positions have been
conciliated and a compromise (mostly political) has been reached, a

131. Allport, supra note 127 at 13—15.
132. In the UK, for instance, much of the discussion preceding the Brexit referendum
was based on the idea that the EU limits the sovereignty of its Member States. This position
has been eloquently rebutted in a report of the European Institute of the London School of
Economics and Political Science (LSE), which noted: “As a Member of the EU a state may
both enhance the sovereignty it retains, and have a say in the development and powers of the
club in those areas where sovereignty is shared or pooled.” Ever Closer Union Report of the
Hearing Held on 15th April, 2016, at 18, LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in
Europe, LSE European Institute, available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66958/1/Hearing-10--Ever-Closer-Union-REPORT.pdf.
133. David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, The Steep Road to European Banking Union:
Constructing the Single Resolution Mechanism, 52 J. COMMON MKT. L. REV. 125, 130—131
(2014).
134. See Aneta Spendzharova, Is More “Brussels” the Solution? New European Union
Member States’ Preferences About the European Financial Architecture, 50 J. COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 315 (2012).
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unanimous consensus, is necessary under TFEU Article 127(6) to entrust
the ECB with new powers and competencies.
The general constitutional ethos, grounded on the concept of
community supported by an idealized interest that is autonomous from the
ones of its constituting members, is transposed to treaty-based institutions
that are called on to represent such a community as a whole. In particular,
the ECB and the Commission, pursue the common interest, however
intended, precisely through the realization of specified objectives that
shape their regulatory and supervisory action. The decision-making
processes to attain these objectives occur under the logics of structured
cooperation, which, as illustrated next, appears to be characterized by CS
and EM forms of sociality.

ii. The Treaty-Based Institutions and Communal Sharing
Form of Sociality
Although the Commission and the ECB are based upon different legal
grounds and have very different institutional settings to discharge their
respective tasks, their key constitutional features are designed to ensure the
pursuit of an interest that transcends the interests of the individual members
participating in the EU legal community. It follows that CS is one of the
dominant forms of sociality within these institutions because this relational
mode directly derives from the idea of Europe advanced by the Treaties.
Within the groups of individuals governing these institutions, structural
cooperation — whether it is created through legal mechanisms or anchored to
an effective shared identity — is a necessary feature to both administer pooled
resources and pursue the common interest by realizing the objectives mandated
by the community.
As earlier noted, the Commission acts as a guardian of and represents
the community’s interest, to the point that it defines itself as the
institutional embodiment the community;135 whereas the ECB preserves the
stability of the Eurozone, in the common interest of its members.136 Their
supranational status with extensive autonomy and independence separates
them from the individual members and entitles them to manage resources
that are pooled in the pursuit of a collective interest. This process occurs
through the principles of consensus, unity and conformity that characterize a
decision-making structure based on CS,137 and manifests itself in the status of
135. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: 1995-2000, 7 (European Commission 1995).
136. Lastra, supra note 62, at 1260.
137. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 697.
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their civil servants. This determines a sense of the group in which individual
positions are channeled through a collective commitment which, in the case
of the Commission and the ECB, is precisely represented by the preservation
of the integrity of the single market. Also, in this case, the existence of
different positions within these bodies does not contradict the CS mode; it
rather represents an inherent phenomenon for decisions taken within a
collective structure.

iii.

The Treaty-Based Institutions and Equality Matching
Form of Sociality

A closer look at the organizational structures and decision-making
processes of the Commission and the ECB reveals that EM is also a
characterizing the relational dynamics within their respective decisionmaking organs, governed under the principle that distinct, but equal
individuals acknowledge their differences to reach an even balance.138 The
coexistence of CS and EM is not surprising as both the Commission and
the ECB have a role in pursuing the common interest and in the definition
of its contents.
Other than being the guardian of the common interest, the
Commission is also the engine of the Union, with its executive, policysetting, and quasi-legislative powers. Pursuant to the grounding provisions
establishing the Commission, it is composed of one Commissioner for each
Member State,139 now twenty-eight Commissioners,140 with one President
proposed by the European Council and elected by the Parliament.141 Under
this framework, Commissioners constitutes the College of Commissioners,
which makes all the decisions under the principle of “collegiality.” Even if
in practice there is little collegial discussion, any decision taken by the
Commission is a collegial decision, to which Commissioners could
contribute.142 However, this praxis has given rise to a host of well-known

138. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 705.
139. TEU, supra note 14, at art. 17(4).
140. As illustrated below, before the UK will formally leave the EU, i.e., two years after
the notification to the European Council of the decision to withdraw from the Union, the EU
is still composed of twenty-eight Member States.
141. TEU, supra note 14, at art. 17(5); TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 244(a), stipulating
that “Member States shall be treated on a strictly equal footing as regards determination of
the sequence of, and the time spent by, their nationals as members of the Commission.”
142. On the decision-making process within the Commission, see Arndt Wonka,
Decision-Making Dynamics in the European Commission: Partisan, National or Sectoral?,
15 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1145 (2008).
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concerns over the democratic accountability of the Commission and the
politicization of its decision-making process within the College of
Commissioners, where the collegiality principle remains, in most cases, a
mere black letter.143
The socio-psychological perspective sheds new light over these issues
that are defined by specific behavioral patterns. The decision-making
structure of the Commission follows the principle one-person equals to
one-vote within the College. This indicates that the EM shapes the
qualitative dimension of interpersonal relationships and operates as a
mechanism for social influence. It follows that when individuals receive a
favor or a concession they feel obliged to reciprocate in order to ensure balance
and equality among group members.144 This in turn may discourage formal
discussions; questioning the decisions proposed by one or more
Commissioners may be perceived to slowdown the realization of the
Commission’s objectives, affecting the overall balance of interpersonal
relationships. To put it differently, this form of sociality, governed by
reciprocity and equality, encourages exchanges and a, more or less explicit,
bargaining process, that has been observed in the College of Commissioners.145
Traditional game theory would explain this phenomenon as a repeated
game, in which players know that a momentary concession will correspond
to a “side payment” or compensation in the future. Under this light, players
aim at getting the best personal outcome and maximize their utility
functions by making choices in consideration of any future compensation.
Fiske’s models provide for a more sophisticated and, possibly, complete
explanation. The ultimate goal within an EM relational mode is the
equilibrium of the entire social group. As noted, such an end also
encompasses considerations over the fairness and the equality of the outcomes
— rather than being limited to the maximization of two (or more) players’
utility functions. The activity of the group and its very existence is determined
by such a tension towards an overall balance, where lack of reciprocity or a
perceived unfairness could result in social sanctioning, given that they
ultimately compromise the survival and the operability of the group. Hence,
what from an outsider’s viewpoint might be perceived as politicization based
on a series of concessions, within the group, it is the essence of a structured

143. See, eg., Fabio Franchino, Delegating Powers in the European Community, 34 B. J.
POL. S. 269 (2004); Susanne K. Schmidt, The European Commission’s Powers in Shaping
Policies,in THE CHANGING EUROPEAN COMMISSION 105 (Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos ed.,
Manchester University Press 2004).
144. See Karen S. Cook & Eric Rice, Social Exchange Theory, HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 61 (John DeLamater & Amanda Ward eds., Springer 2013).
145. See Wonka, supra note 142.

2017]

EU Financial Regulators

107

cooperation that justifies the existence of the group and its decisions.
The EM relational mode can also be found in the ECB governing
organs. Within the ECB there are three decision-making organs, namely: i)
the Governing Council, which is entrusted with the power of formulating
monetary policy for the Eurozone, defining guidelines for national central
banks operating in the European Central Banks System, and, under the
newly established SSM, setting the general framework under which
supervisory actions are conducted and objecting the decisions proposed by
the Supervisory Board; ii) the Executive Board, whose role is to implement
the guidelines established by the Governing Council and coordinates
national central banks; and iii) the newly established Supervisory Board
that coordinates the supervisory activities under the SSM. The Supervisory
Board is composed of eighteen country’s representatives plus a Chair, a
Vice-Chair and four representatives of the ECB not involved in monetary
tasks. The aim is to create a Supervisory Board that is in line with the EU
constitutional framework that attributes, under TFEU Article 127(6),
supervisory functions to the ECB, and independent enough from the
monetary policy tasks conducted by the ECB in order to avoid conflict of
interests between banking supervision and monetary stability. 146
The Governing Council is the primary decision-making body and
is composed of the governors of the national central banks that are a
part of the Eurozone, plus the members of the Executive Board
(President, Vice-President and four other independent individuals). 147
Governors shall not represent the interests of their country and they
are members in their capacity as independent experts. Members of the
Board are independent and are appointed for eight years, 148 which
exceeds the terms of any national government as well as the terms of
any other European institutions. In order to avoid coalitions among
Member States the Executive Board sets the agenda and, since
Lithuania’s accession to the Eurozone as of 2015, the voting follows a
rotating system capped at twenty-one voters. Governors are allocated
to different groups based on the size of their country’s economy and
financial sector. As long as the Eurozone has between eighteen and
twenty-one participating countries there are two groups. The five
largest countries constitute the first group and they share a total of
four voting rights that rotate monthly. 149 Thus, every month one of the
146. A mediation mechanism has been also established, when the Governing Council
and the Supervisory Board are in disagreement.
147. TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 283(1).
148. Id. at art. 283(2).
149. The countries in this group are France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.
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governors of the five largest countries would not vote, but may
participate in the discussion. The remaining governors share a total of
eleven voting rights, which also rotate on a monthly basis. The six
members of the Executive Board are permanent voters. This creates a
system based on a collective decision-making process where one
person is equal to one vote; although non-voting countries are
determined through a frequency that changes depending on the
dimension of the country. Members of the Governing Council may
predict when they will not vote, but they are naturally unaware of the
decisions on which they will be asked to vote. Hence, decisions are
taken under what resembles a ‘veil of ignorance’ that sustains the EM
form of relationship.150

iv. Non-Treaty-Based Institutions and Market Pricing
Form of Sociality
The ESAs and the ESRB have been established under TFEU Article
114, which allows treaty-based institutions to delegate specific task to ad
hoc created authorities, as long as they are devices to serve the
community’s interest of protecting the single market through the
harmonization of EU law. It follows that the ESAs and the ESRB are, from
a constitutional perspective, means to achieve the general interest and,
following the categorization offered in Part II, they operate the common
interest by ensuring regulatory and supervisory convergence.
We argue that these institutions, which are not included in the
pantheon of EU institutions enshrined in the Treaties, operate mainly under
the MP form of sociality. We focus mainly on the example of the ESMA,
which has broad powers. It drafts technical standard, advances proposals,
and issue ‘comply or explain’ notices, which hardens non-binding
guidelines and recommendations that could be also adopted.151 ESMA
shares common elements with EU agencies, including a strong reliance on
technical expertise, legal personality, degree of independence, and
procedures to be followed by its governing organ.152
These features, together with ESMA’s broad powers, are of particular
relevance to analyze the sociopsychological model of this institution.
Whereas the treaty-based inter-institutional lawmaking process is designed

150. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 705.
151. ESMA Regulation, supra note 33, at art. 16.
152. For a thorough analysis over the mechanisms and the functioning of ESMA, see
Moloney, supra note 91.
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to produce high-level principles and is inspired in its dynamic by common
ideals,153 administrative rule-making in the securities and markets sphere,
produced with a major role of ESMA, is more technical and inspired by
economic considerations. This characteristic is likely to tip the culture at
ESMA toward Market Pricing. Overall, it can indeed be observed that
securities and market regulation is primarily directed to the support of
market efficiency, transparency and integrity as well as to the protection of
consumers and investors.154 The traditional justification for regulatory
intervention, in financial as well as other markets, relies on the idea that a
regulatory intervention is necessary to correct market failures.155 Those are
situations in which markets fail to reach an optimal equilibrium and, as a
consequence, allocation of resources ceases to be efficient. This may occur
for various reasons. For instance, when financial instruments may not be
correctly priced by market participants due to asymmetric information, or
when “the well-being of one economic agent (consumer or firm) is directly
affected by the actions of another” that results in negative externalities.156 It
also occurs when a diffused financial instability is generated by a market
participant’s failure. Following this rationale, a regulatory intervention is thus
required and justified. Conduct of business rules, consumers and investors
protection standards as well as regulations affecting the governance of
financial institutions, their solvability and possible failures are grounded on
this rationale and necessarily impose a level of expertise to draft detailed
provisions that are intended to correct markets’ imperfection, by steering
the behaviors of financial entities while ensuring their economic viability.
The hypothesis that an MP mode of sociality characterizes ESMA is
further confirmed by the structure of the institution. ESMA’s primary
decision-making organ is the Board of Supervisors, composed of the heads
of Member States’ supervisors, defined as National Competent Authorities
(NCAs). The Chairperson of ESMA sits on the Board and chairs the
meeting, although with no voting right. The Board also includes

153. The treaty-based inter-institutional lawmaking process elements are intergovernmental
(the Council), representative (the European Parliament), and supranational (the Commission).
154. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets
48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001). See also, for the policy perspective, Mitigating Systemic Risk. A Role
for Securities Regulators, International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (Feb.
2011), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf.
155. On the rationale (and its limits) of markets failures to justify regulation, see, e.g.,
Baldwin et al. supra note 10; ANTHONY I OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC
THEORY (Bloomsbury Publishing 2004).
156. John Kay & John Vickers, Regulatory Reform An Appraisal, DEREGULATION OR REREGULATION: REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 221—226
(Giandomencio Majone ed., St. Martin’s 1990).
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representatives (with no voting rights) of: the Commission (as for any EU
agency), the ESRB, EBA, and EIOPA. With such a configuration, the
Board combines the scientific expertise functions with political oversight,
two functions that are usually separated. The Board gives guidance to the
work of ESMA, adopts opinions, recommendations, decisions and advice.
The Board operates under a simple majority vote; each Board member has
one voting right and they are all required not to advance the interest of their
respective Member States.157 Alongside the Board of Supervisors, there is
the Management Board which is composed of the Chairperson and six
members of the Board of Supervisors. The members of the Management
Board are elected by the voting members of the Board of Supervisors.158
Also in this case, the Commission and the Executive Director participate in
meetings, but have no voting rights.159 The Management Board operates on a
simple majority rule basis. The Management Board has to propose for adoption
by the Board of Supervisors an annual and multi-annual work program. In
addition, to facilitate consultation with stakeholders, ESMA has established a
consultative Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (SMSG).160 It is consulted
in practice by ESMA on various matters, including technical aspects. The
dialogue with stakeholders and experts evidences the importance granted to market
participants in defining the rules through which financial markets may function.
This description enables us to understand the double nature of ESMA,
and the other two ESAs in general.161 First, it is a body in charge of
building EU common rules and as such it should “protect the public interest
by contributing to the [. . .] stability and effectiveness of the financial system,
for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses.”162 Moreover, ESMA
should act independently and autonomously “in the sole interest of the Union
as a whole” without seeking instructions from other European institutions or
from Member States.”163 In its 2011 annual report, ESMA identified the six
characteristics as to how it achieves its mission and objectives: independently,
cooperatively, with accountability, professionalism, and effectiveness.164 The
identification of specific operational rules and guiding principles against which

157. ESMA Regulation, supra note 33, at art. 44(1).
158. Id. at art. 45(1).
159. Id. at art. 45(2); However, according to Article 45(3), the representative of the
Commission has voting rights on matters related to the ESMA’s budget.
160. Id. at art. 37.
161. The provisions here analyzed are also contained in the regulations establishing the
EBA and the EIOPA.
162. ESMA Regulation, supra note 33, at art. 1(5).
163. Id. at art. 42 para 1.
164. European Securities and Markets Authority Annual Report 9, (2011).
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ESMA regulatory activity is benchmarked points towards a prominence of
a modus operandi characterized by an MP relational mode.
Second, notwithstanding the intergovernmental ethos, representatives
of NCAs on the Board of Supervisors are naturally incentivized to take into
account, if not promote, their national positions. In fact, ESMA’s resources
are limited and its working model is dependent on NCAs resources.165 The
pressure for adopting certain measures, and to allocate resources in a manner
that is in line with national interests, ensures the necessity for a decision
making process based on negotiation among the members of the Board, i.e.
the representatives of NCAs. The resulting organizational structure naturally
leads to a bargaining culture that is a primary characteristic of MP, whereby
motives based on the pursuit of individual interests may overbear the search
for an overall balance. This is further evidenced in some of the
observations advanced in the 2013 Mazars ESA Review.166 The Review
stressed the importance of reaching a balance between EU-wide and
national interests.167 As earlier noted, similar considerations have been
advanced towards another ESA, i.e., the EBA. Also in this case, the sociopsychological perspective advanced here reveals that bargaining is a natural
manifestation of a group dynamic in which multiple individual interests are
more prominent (and tangible) than the pursuit of an idealized common
interest. The problems related to the growing role of the ESA, hence,
appear to reside in the compromise between the interests of Member States
and those of the Union. Absent an institution that represents the common
interest also in the processes of regulatory and supervisory convergence, an
“exchange relationship,” either based on EM or MP, is expected.

IV. Regulators in Crisis: a Sociological and Psychological
Perspective
The relational models appear to be useful, not only to describe more
accurately the dynamics driving the decision-making process of EU bodies
involved in financial regulation; they also offer a conceptual framework
that sheds light over the development of conflicts amongst Member States,
or groups thereof, when their representatives participate in collective
structures. Conflicts appear to arise and be managed following specific
behavioral patterns that can be ascribed to each dominant form of sociality.

165. ESMA Regulation, supra note 33, at art. 62(1).
166. See generally, The European Supervisory Agency, Review of the New European
System of Financial Supervision, Mazars (2013).
167. Id. Part 1 at 14.
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This is to say that, for a given disruption in the expected relational dynamics
within an institution, direct or indirect consequences within the group may be
isolated. For instance, if one or more members of the group characterized by
the CS or the EM relational archetypes does not follow the appropriate group
norm, other members of that group are likely to sanction them or the group
is likely to fracture into sub-groups. In this schema, it is assumed that the
group continues to operate and the collective structure does not
immediately cease to exist.
In this respect, the current Brexit debate — preceding and following
the result of the referendum of June 23, 2016, when the UK voted to leave
the EU — offers a perfect case study to examine how different, and often
antithetic, positions advanced by EU Member States influences the group
dynamics operating within different EU institutions and bodies.168 At the
time of writing (October 2016), the UK has signaled that it does not share
the common interest upon which the Union is constructed. As further
elaborated below, this emerges not only from the result of the June
referendum, it also transpires from the official talks preceding the public
vote. However, given that the formal withdrawal procedure enshrined in
TEU Article 50 has not been activated, the UK is still a member of the
Union. Hence, the UK is still participating in most of the official meetings
of the European Council and its representatives still hold positions in EU
institutions, such as the Commission and the ESAs. EU officials and
governments of Member States have made clear on multiple occasions that
no informal negotiation over the future UK-EU relationships will be held
before the UK will formally notify its intentions of leaving; a possibility
that seems likely to occur by the end of March 2017.169 From that moment,
pursuant to TEU Article 50, there is a window of two years to define the
UK-EU relationships, after which the UK will be effectively out of the
Union, with or without a deal with the Union of twenty-seven countries.170
In this context, while the Union still performs its tasks and functions
relying on an institutional setting designed for twenty-eight countries, the

168. For a first assessment of the possible implications of Brexit, see Niamh Moloney, Financial
Services, The EU, and Brexit: An Uncertain Future For The City? 17 GER. L.J. 75 (2016).
169. Jenny Gross & Nicholas Winning, U.K.’s Theresa May Pledges to Set EU Divorce
in Motion by End of March, WALL ST. J. Oct. 2, 2016.
170. In particular, TEU art. 50 para 3 states: “The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in
question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after
the notification […], unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned,
unanimously decides to extend this period.”
For an analysis over the mechanism put forward by TEU art. 50, see European Parliament,
Brief: Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal of A Member State From The EU, European
Parliamentary Research Service PE 577.971 (Feb. 2016).
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position of the representatives of the UK in different decision-making
organs is peculiar. A black-letter analysis of the constitutional framework
governing the EU is not sufficiently equipped to grasp such a complex and
uncertain political situation.171 In turn, by enriching the legal analysis with
a socio-psychological perspective over the group dynamics within
institutions provides a much deeper understanding of an unfolding debate
that will have ripple effects in the years to come.

A.

The Development of A Divide

In general terms, the primary source of tension in EU institutions
derives from the emergence and the consolidation of two groups of
countries, notably Eurozone countries and non-Eurozone countries. This
divide may be observed in different instances ranging from the closed
borders of a common monetary policy to reach critical aspects of financial
regulation and crises resolution. Within the EU, the interests of the
Eurozone and those of the single markets are not necessarily aligned.
Distinguished commentators have noted that the decisions taken to
safeguard the former also have an impact on the latter, although the input
of non-Eurozone countries in the decision-making process is limited, if not
absent.172 This situation may be described as a misalignment within the
various possible definitions of the contents of the common interest: the
recent financial, euro, and sovereign debt crises accentuated centrifugal
forces potentially separating non-Eurozone countries from the rest of the
Union.
The inclusion of financial stability within the perimeters of the
common interests is particularly pronounced for Member States that are
taking part in the SSM. The preservation of financial stability is
constructed as deriving from the maintenance of the integrity of the single
market. However, the interconnection between the banking sector,
sovereign debts, monetary policy, and the single currency required
Eurozone countries to design responses that are tailored to preserve the
monetary union, mostly through further integration. For Eurozone
countries the primary concern has been to break the link between the
banking sector and sovereign states, whereby public funds are required to
171. For an overview of the different political positions and their possible implications
on the UK financial industry, see Thomas F. Huertas, Brexit v the City: A Fight With One
Winner, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 26, 2016.
172. Paul Craig & Menelaos Markakis, The Euro Area, Its Regulation and Impact on
Non-Euro Member States, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE EU’S INTERNAL
MARKET (Edward Elgar ed., 2016) (on file with author).
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bail out troubled banks by deepening the national debts and compromising
monetary stability.173 Hence, the establishment of the Banking Union has
strengthened supervisory convergence through an increased attribution of
powers at the supranational level. Drawing from the relational archetypes
and with reference to the three main layers that posit EU institutions at
different distances from the common interests, it is possible to examine how
this divide within the Union affects the decision-making process and, more
generally, the relational dynamics within institutions.
When CS operates, there is equality among members, which are units
with the same weight and not ranked or organized under a hierarchical
structure. As a result, the decisions made are unitary, in the sense that they
represent the whole rather than the result of bilateral bargaining. This
equivalence derives from a group norm that determines a sense of belonging
towards the group or the community and, ultimately, legitimizes its very
existence.174 Prolonged dissent may weaken the strength of the whole
community in two intertwined fashions. First, dissent shows a disagreement
towards the group norm upon which the collective structure is established.
This makes the participation into the group less rewarding and may
ultimately lead one or more individuals to withdraw from the group.175
Second, constant dissent leads to undermining the relational equivalence
among members and signals a lack of sense of belonging. 176 Hence, the
principles of proportionality and equality among members of groups
operating under EM relational modes also enter into crisis. Within the
European institutional framework earlier described, this means that if the
existence of the common interest stipulated in the Treaties and justifying
the existence of supranational apparatus is compromised, decision-making
organs entrusted with the powers to define the contents of such a common
interest are also compromised.
The problem emerges clearly from the impact that the UK vote to leave the
EU had immediately on the College of Commissioners. The Commissioner for
the UK, Lord Hill, held the crucial role of advancing the financial regulatory
agenda of the Union, being Commissioner for Financial Stability, Financial
Services and Capital Markets Union. After the results of the referendum, Lord
Hill, who was one of the key promoters of the Capital Markets Union, resigned
173. In the landmark Euro Area Summit, Eurozone countries stated: “We affirm that it is
imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.” Euro Area Summit
Statement, at 1, June 29, 2012, available in full at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs
/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf.
174. Allport, supra note 127, at 14.
175. Id. at 11.
176. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 697.
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and Mr. Dombrovskis (Latvia), Vice-President of the Commission and
Commissioner for the Euro and Social Dialogue, has taken over his position.177
Given that the UK is still part of the EU a new UK Commissioner for the
Security Union has been appointed, Sir Julian King.178 However, from the
Mission Letter from the President of the Commission, it emerges that the new
Commissioner will be mostly in charge of implementing “concrete operational
measures,”179 rather than focusing on policymaking. Moreover, Sir Julian will
not represent the Commission in the European Parliament and at meetings of
national ministers; a crucial role maintained by the previous Commissioner.180 It
is clear that the representative for the UK in the College of Commissioners is not
anymore considered as formally equal, i.e., with the same powers and
prerogatives, to the other Commissioners. His role has been ultimately curtailed,
thus weakening the equality paradigm that characterizes a group dominated by
the EM form of sociality.
Such an epitomic case explains a broader dynamic. Once the common
interest is understood as the group norm bonding the Union together as a
legal community and driving the decisions of treaty-based institutions, the
socio-psychological standpoint explains how a sharper distinction between
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries polarizes the decision-making process
in two sub-groups. As a result, a conflict between “insiders” and “outsiders”
in the Eurozone may emerge in institution where all Member States are
called on to cooperate, even when the decision making process is dominated
by a relational mode that is not CS. Within such groups, the existence of a
profound dissent not only affects the political relationships among Member
States, but it is likely to call into question the very existence of both a shared
bond and the equal relation that ensures the cooperation among its members.
The erosion of the common interest — real or idealized — upon which the EU
is constructed has therefore cascading consequences throughout the different
decision-making centers of the EU institutional framework.

177. Jim Brunsden, UK’s EU Commissioner Lord Hill Quits as British Departures Begin,
FINANCIAL TIMES, June 25, 2016; Jim Brunsden, Brexit Gives Valdis Dombrovskis Big Sway
Over Banks, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 30, 2016.
178. Mehreen Khan, Juncker To Appoint New UK Commissioner As ‘Security’ Chief,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 2, 2016.
179. Mission Letter from Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission,
to Julian King, Member of the European Commission at 4 (Aug. 2, 2016), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/king_en.pdf.
180. Id. at 5.
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B. The Experience of Centrifugal Tensions: “Insider vs.
Outsider”
The existence of Member States that partake in only some features of
the Union is not new in the history of the EU and is often referred to as a
phenomenon of differentiated integration. Accordingly, Member States may
opt for different levels of integration ensuing different levels of abdication of
state prerogatives, on specific matters, towards the supranational institutional
apparatus.181 Differentiation characterizes the genesis of the EU that from a
small group of founding members progressively enlarged and conflated
different communities into a supranational union. In this process different
opt-out clauses, notably to the Schengen Agreement and to the monetary
union, have been granted to Member States. Nonetheless, the division
between countries that adopted the euro and countries that opted out is
becoming more pronounced. Following the recent crises and the
establishment of the Banking Union the risk of a two-speed Europe has
been particularly strong. There is even a risk for differentiation to evolve
into fragmentation, as already witnessed in the discontent that has animated
the debate over the UK leaving the Union. With the Brexit vote,
fragmentation is now becoming a tangible risk that the EU has to tackle.
Aside from any speculation over the possible future of the UK and the
EU as a whole, the theory of the forms of sociality applied to EU financial
regulators helps to identify an increasingly sharp division within groups of
individuals entrusted with decision-making powers. Such a division
implies that outsiders, i.e., countries not participating in a given project
harden their positions, while insiders, i.e., countries partaking in the new
project, expect the former to join.182 Beyond this, a sociopsychological
standpoint indicates that the differentiation between outsiders and insiders
may induce insiders to concentrate around a new shared interest that
defines a new bond, or even a new common identity, which, in turn, is
further legitimized by the existence of outsiders not sharing such a bond,
whose common interest may harden as well towards a new shared objective.183
181. See Benjamin Leruth & Christopher Lord, Differentiated Integration in the
European Union: A Concept, a Process or a Theory? 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 754 (2015);
Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leuffen & Berthold Rittberger, The European Union as a
System of Differentiated Integration, Politicization and Differentiation, 22 J. EUR. PUB.
POL. 764 (2015); Jean-Francois Jamet, The Optimal Assignment of Prerogatives to Different
Levels of Government in the EU, 49 J. COMMON MRKT. STUD. 563 (2011).
182. Thierry Chopin & Christian Lequesne, Differentiation as a Double-Edged Sword:
Member States’ Practices and Brexit, 92 INT’L AFF. 531 (2016).
183. Fiske notes that CS, in its extreme form, may imply “a contrast between the subjective
‘we’ and the objectified ‘they.’” Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 699.
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The unfolding events concerning Brexit offer a powerful illustration of such a
group dynamic. A progressive crystallization of different positions around
new or reinforced shared objectives emerges from the declarations of
European politicians during the current talks, preceding the formal
commencement of the EU-UK negotiations. In particular, reports over the
alleged stance of EU negotiators to use French, rather than English, as the
official language of the negotiation process regarding the EU-UK
relationships signals, other than a possible pre-negotiation tactic, the search
for a new group identity for EU Member States.184 Likewise, the
polarization of a group around a hardened common interest, towards which
individual interests converge and are superseded, is apparent if one
considers that negotiations will be conducted between the EU — a block of
twenty-seven countries that is expected to act, by virtue of the legal
obligations established in the Treaties, as a unitary entity protecting its
existence — and the UK, a single sovereign state. This polarization is
exemplified by the fact that the first meetings of the European Council after
Brexit — on June 29, 2016 (Brussels) and on September 16, 2016,
(Bratislava) — were held informally, without the participation of the UK.
They led to what has been labeled as the Bratislava Declaration and
Roadmap that deals with the new institutional setting of the Union.185 The
Declaration reaffirmed the necessity of pursuing a common interest and of
also correcting the flaws of the EU, but without putting forward any
concrete policy decision.186 In contrast, during the recent official meeting
of the European Council with all twenty-eight Member States (Brussels,
October 20 and 21, 2016), Brexit talks were left at the end of the agenda
and itemized as reflections “on the future of the EU with twenty-seven
member countries.”187

184. Francesco Guarascio, Parlez-vous Brexit? EU Negotiator Wants Brits to Talk
French, REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2016.
185. European Council, Bratislava Declaration, 1 (informal meeting, Sept. 16, 2016), available
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2016/09/16-informal-meeting/.
186. In particular, the Bratislava Declaration opens with the following statement:
“Although one country has decided to leave, the EU remains indispensable for the rest of us.
In the aftermath of the wars and deep divisions on our continent, the EU secured peace,
democracy and enabled our countries to prosper. […] We are determined to make a success of
the EU with 27 Member States, building on this joint history [emphasis added].” Id. at 1. Two
crucial aspects may be noted from this incipit. First, the locutions “one country” contraposed to
“the rest of us” (or “our continent”) point towards a hiatus between a de-individualized outsider
and the subjective insiders; on that aspect see Juncker’s Speech, supra note 173. Second,
reference to the “wars and deep divisions” (as well as to the “joint history”) echoes the Schuman
declaration of 1950; see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
187. See Donald Tusk, President of European Parliament, Remarks of The President of
The European Parliament Following The European Council Meeting (Oct. 20—21, 2016).
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Leaving aside the current debates concerning Brexit, the dynamics and
legal implications of which are beyond the scope of this work, the
agreement, reached by the UK Prime Minister during the European Council
(February 18 and 19, 2016) as a condition for the UK to remain, already
signaled a misalignment between the interests of the EU and those of the
monetary union.188 Such a separation is sustained by the general opt-out
for the UK on an ever closer Union.189 Even more, it is expressly stated
that reference to an ever closer Union contained in the Treaties does not
constitute a legal basis for expanding the scope, the competencies, or the
powers of the EU and of its institutions.190 Among the various items of that
agreement, of particular interest for the purposes of this analysis are those
defining the perimeters of the Banking Union and the relationships between
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. In this respect, the agreement
advocates for a stronger protection for the latter group of Member States; and,
hence, a sharper separation between the two groups. The agreement, albeit
recognizing the necessity to deepen the monetary union supported by a
Banking Union, reaffirms the already established principle of
nondiscrimination towards non-Eurozone Member States and the possibility of
creating a European Union where the regulation and supervision of banking
institutions follows two separate paths. Moreover, the agreement also
reaffirms a principle already encountered in the OLAF decision and
according to which the EU institutions involved in the governance of the
Eurozone should be subjected to EU Law at large, and their decisions
should involve non-Eurozone Member States when affected. What is
certain is that the completion of the Brexit process calls into question the
applicability of the protections against discrimination based on location and
currency for the UK financial services industry.191
The legal implications and the effective departures from the existing
EU legal framework if the agreement would have been enforced are
impossible to ascertain; ultimately, given the current circumstances, the

188. European Council, Conclusions, Brussels (Feb. 19, 2016).
189. The agreement commences the section titled “Sovereignty” with the following statement:
“It is recognised that the United Kingdom […] is not committed to further political
integration into the European Union. The substance of this will be incorporated into the
Treaties at the time of their next revision […] so as to make it clear that the references to
ever closer union do not apply to the United Kingdom.” Id. at Annex 1, p.16.
190. Id.
191. On the possible impacts on and opportunities for the UK financial services industry
following the completion of Brexit see Eilís Ferran, The UK as a Third Country Actor in EU
Financial Services Regulation (University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law Legal Studies
Research Papers, Paper No. 47/2016, 2016), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper
s.cfm?abstract_id=2845374.
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document represents a legal memorabilia. As such, however, the
agreement may be interpreted as a request for enhanced transparency and
participatory accountability amongst Member States with different
priorities. Nonetheless, a divide within the Union emerges distinctively
when the agreement and its language are juxtaposed to the agenda set forth
in the Five Presidents Report issued by the Commission in 2015.192
The Report, which still marks the agenda of the EU, posits a greater
level of integration to strengthen economic and monetary union as primary
items of the EU agenda. It is envisaged as an action plan in three steps to
establish a fiscal union, a capital markets union, and, more generally, a
financial union that should be paired with a reinforced representation of
Eurozone Member States in international fora, e.g., at the IMF, and within
the EU, with more structured governance bodies; and, interestingly,
culminates with a 2025 goal of having a stronger single currency that is
“attractive for other EU Member States to join if they are ready to do
so.”193 The resulting division amongst different groups of Member States
seems to progressively polarize, as the theory of social relations would
predict, around two group norms. One is represented by the pursuit of a
common interest that, in order to achieve financial stability and monetary
union, requires further integration; whereas the second group intends the
common interest as more limited and primarily based on economic and
trade interests that are necessarily shared. The latter group includes
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
and Sweden,194 but it may also include the UK, shall the UK continue to
have access to the single market, or to be part of it. The exact contents of
such a more contained common interest depends on many variables that
may open to different future scenarios.
It may already be noted that the establishment of a Banking Union and
the project for a Financial Union, may be understood as a reinforcement of
the group norm bonding (some) members of the EU legal community, which
192. Jean-Claude Junckeret et al., President of the European Commission, The Five
President’s Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (2015).
193. Id. at 5.
194. Under the Maastricht Treaty, any country joining the EU is obliged to adopt the
euro provided that they fulfill the convergence criteria (including price stability, soundness
and sustainability of public finances, durability of convergence, and exchange rate stability).
Denmark and the UK obtained an opt-out to the Maastricht Treaty. Hence, since the
moment Brexit will be effective, only Denmark is exempted from joining the Eurozone.
Thus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden will join
the Eurozone eventually. However, the Global Financial Crisis has halted this process of
convergence rendering uncertain when these will adopt the single currency. For a review of
the different levels economic integration and the legal framework of these countries, see
Convergence Report 2014, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (Frankfurt, 2014).
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encompasses sovereign entities as well as regulated industries. This greater
level of integration is usually justified by the necessity of increasing the
resilience of European markets towards financial crises.
From a
sociopsychological perspective, a reinforcement of the group norm also
represents a step against the possibility of fragmentation of the community
(especially felt after the UK referendum) whether it arises from either external
factors, or dissent within the group, or a combination of both. It follows that
members participating in the Banking Union, or in any new project leading
to a stronger integration, are subjected to an “enhanced group norm,”
according to which the common interest is achieved also through
regulatory and supervisory convergence.
The emerging divide is carried through the decision-making process of
EU bodies and agencies involved in financial regulation. The different
priorities and understandings of the group norm are to influence the relational
dynamics both between and within EU institutions, where the representatives
of Eurozone and non-Eurozone states cooperate. Hence, widening the gap
with nonparticipating countries may result in a higher level of dissent and in
a weakened equivalence relationship in the EU architectural framework for
financial regulation.

V. Conclusion
Attempts to describe the behaviors and the group dynamics driving the
decision making process of regulators — and, in particular, EU financial
regulators — have been sketchy and disappointing, as the minute
comparison of different regulatory approaches or the game metaphor, albeit
offering useful insights, do not enrich our understanding. Our work uses
the rich vocabulary and conceptual frameworks of psychology as it
approaches financial regulation in the EU from a sociopsychological
perspective. Regulators are considered as collective groups of individuals
and, as such, they respond to the fundamental forms of sociality defining
any human interaction. Through these lenses, principles for interpersonal and
inter-institutional cooperation, membership criteria, organizational structures
as well as shared goals and objectives shape decision-making for regulators.
Such principles are formalized in the legal framework, primarily through the
definition of regulators’ remits and procedural provisions.
In turn, the legal framework appears to have an impact on the fashions
in which social interactions occur. Dominant forms of sociality may be
identified and specific behavioral patterns emerge for each of the
institutions here examined. This explains, under a novel perspective, some
of the common issues affecting the EU governance apparatus, such as the
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expanding definition of the common interest, the politicization of the
Commission, the issues related to the new supervisory agencies (ESAs), and
the impact of Brexit on the intra-institutional decision-making process of
financial regulators. Moving from this first attempt to apply social
psychology to shed some light on regulators, it is our hope that further
investigations will be conducted in what appears to be a new approach to
regulation studies.
In the context of financial regulation, it emerges that the relational
structures of EU bodies and institutions are affected by their constitutional status,
membership rules, and the functional relation they perform vis-à-vis the
common interest. Furthermore, different interpretations and understandings of
the common interest that have been coexisting are now generating a divide
between Eurozone and non-Eurozone Member States now emphasized by the
results of the UK referendum. Such a divide may undermine the core bond that
characterizes the collective decision-making process when both groups of
countries are involved in the same decision-making process.

